Australian Government
Australian Civil-Military Centre

Australian Council For International Development

SAME SPACE – DIFFERENT MANDATES

A Civil-Military-Police Guide for Stakeholders in International Disaster and Conflict Response

2023 Edition

About the Australian Civil-Military Centre

The Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) was established in November 2008 in recognition of the growing importance of civil-military-police interaction and is evidence of Australia's commitment to sustainable peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

The ACMC's mission is to support the development of national civil-military-police capabilities to prevent, prepare for and respond more effectively to disasters and complex emergencies, including conflicts, overseas. At its core is a multiagency approach, with staff drawn from Australian Government departments and agencies, the New Zealand Government, and the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector.

Applying this collaborative approach, the ACMC delivers a unique capability to government, promoting civil-military-police cooperation domestically and throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

Our success is measured by how well Australia prepares and mobilises our national efforts in response to disasters and other crises.

For more information see ACMC at www.acmc.gov.au

About the Australian Council for International Development

The Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) is the peak body for Australian non-government organisations involved in international development and humanitarian action.

Founded in 1965, ACFID currently has 128 full members and 21 affiliates operating in more than 65 developing countries. The total revenue raised by ACFID's membership from all sources amounts to $1.83 billion (2020-21), $721 million of which is raised from over 996,000 Australians. ACFID's members range between large Australian multisectoral organisations that are linked to international federations of NGOs, agencies with specialised thematic expertise, and smaller community-based groups, with a mix of secular and faith-based organisations.

ACFID members must comply with the ACFID Code of Conduct, a voluntary, self-regulatory sector code of good practice that aims to improve international development and humanitarian action outcomes and increase stakeholder trust by enhancing the transparency, accountability and effectiveness of signatory organisations. Covering nine quality principles, 33 commitments and 92 compliance indicators, the code sets good standards for program effectiveness, fundraising, governance and financial reporting. Compliance activities include annual reporting and checks. The code has an independent complaint-handling process.

The ACFID Humanitarian Reference Group and the ACFID Civil-Military Community of Practice are, respectively, a delegated committee of the executive and a peer-learning network. Both are actively engaged in addressing civil-military issues from an Australian perspective to improve outcomes for people affected in humanitarian response.

For more information, see ACFID at www.acfid.asn.au

ISBN: 978-1-921933-31-8

This publication is the 3rd edition.

Originally published – May 2012

Edited – May 2015

Revised publication – March 2023

Disclaimer

Suggested citation

Australian Civil-Military Centre/Australian Council for International Development

Same Space – Different Mandates, A Civil-Military-Police Guide for Stakeholders in International Disaster and Conflict Response, 2023 Edition.

Contact us

We will review this document periodically. Your comments and suggestions are welcome and can be sent to communications@acmc.gov.au.

Website ACMC: acmc.gov.au

Website ACFID: acfid.asn.au

Contents

Foreword

The challenges of COVID-19, climate change and conflict are increasing global humanitarian needs. Countries across the world are experiencing increased frequency and severity of climate-related disasters. The economic and social disruptions caused by the pandemic, particularly in developing countries, have had enormous impacts, exposing and exacerbating existing vulnerabilities.

The humanitarian system and the diverse entities that engage with the system to deliver assistance and protection are facing both dilemmas and opportunities. Humanitarian access, protection of civilians and security are key challenges. Humanitarian, military and police systems and actors are evolving to meet these challenges. This includes how coordination between civilians, military and police happens when preparing and responding to disasters and complex emergencies. New global agreements and frameworks – like the 'Grand Bargain' between humanitarian donors, the United Nations and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction – have been adopted and are informing changes to policy and practice. The shift to devolve resources down to local responders in disasters, (known as 'localisation') is changing the way aid donors and INGOs are working. There is an important opportunity for better civil-military-police coordination to play a supportive role by supporting affected communities to lead their own recovery.

Learning and progress have occurred among defence forces, police, government agencies and the humanitarian community contributing to improved interaction while working in the same space, particularly in response to disasters. Nevertheless, a lack of understanding and sometimes confusion regarding roles, responsibilities, terminologies and cultures remains among these stakeholders. Tensions continue to exist between political, humanitarian and military objectives. The humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence are being tested by armed actors in some conflicts disregarding humanitarian actors or, worse, seeing them as a target. We know these issues can and do impede

communication, coordination and ultimately effectiveness in meeting the humanitarian needs of crisis-affected people.

Same Space – Different Mandates aims to improve the collective understanding of civil, military and police stakeholders responding to international disasters and complex emergencies. This revised *2023 edition* incorporates emerging concepts and practice to ensure accuracy and future value. While this guide is written from an Australian perspective, it is relevant to government, military, police and civil society organisations in the Indo-Pacific Region and the wider international community.

Our aspiration and intent are that this publication promotes productive relationships, dialogue and constructive civil-military-police interaction resulting in more effective disaster and complex emergency response.

Ms Nicola Rosenblum

Executive Director
Australian Civil-Military Centre

Mr Marc Purcell

Chief Executive Director (CEO)
Australian Council for
International Development

Acknowledgements

This publication is funded by the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC).

Same Space – Different Mandates, 2023 Edition is the result of a collaborative effort involving many individuals, institutions and agencies. ACMC wishes to thank members of the working group and the drafting team.

Working group members: Carol Angir (ActionAid), Alan Aoki (CFE-DM), Claire Armstrong (AFP), Murray Booker (ACMC), Bediako Buahene (OCHA), Natasha Chabbra (ACFID), Eleanor Cupit (DFAT), Eleanor Davey (HAG), Beth Eggleston (HAG), Sophie Ford (ARC), Jules Frost (ACMC), Rob Grace (Brown University), Nadine Haddad (World Vision), Martin Hess (AFP), Idha Kurniasih (HAG), Kylie Leach (ARC), Michael Marx (WFP), Alberto (Mo) Morales (CFE-DM), Ganesh Navaratnam (IFRC), Douglas Perrers (ADF), Colin Reynolds (AFP), Caitlin Ryan (AFP), Helene Skaardal (OCHA), Tony Speldewinde (AFP), Tu Tangi (Plan Australia) and David Tuck (ICRC).

We thank the Pacific Islands Association of NGOs (PIANGO) and the Fiji Council of Social Services (FCOSS) for their expert input.

Drafting team: Natasha Chabbra, Beth Eggleston, Jules Frost, Rob Grace, Idha Kurniasih and David Tuck.

Graphic design: Jenny Moody, A&J Moody Design

Copy edit: Wendy Elliott, Apricot Zebra

We acknowledge everyone who worked on the past versions (2012 and 2015).

Chapter 1: Why do we need this guide?

While the scale and frequency of crises are increasing, the *way* in which we respond is also fundamentally changing. The shift to support locally led response to emergencies is well underway and how organisations coordinate, how they operate and how they finance the response to crises looks very different to even a decade ago.[1]

Since the previous edition of this publication in 2015, concurrent and cascading challenges of COVID-19, climate change, and conflict have been mounting pressure and increasing global humanitarian needs. Economic and social disruption caused by the pandemic has had enormous impacts, exposing and exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. Rich and poor countries alike are experiencing increased frequency and severity of climate-related disasters. The nature of conflict is shifting, as illustrated by the war in Ukraine, and global displacement has reached a high of 100 million people. There has been also a major focus on safeguarding and on prevention of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (PSEAH), triggered in 2018 by evidence of sexual exploitation within the global humanitarian system in Haiti. This has led donors, including the Australian Government, to strengthen policies and procedures, enhancing accountability mechanisms and the knowledge of humanitarian workers.[2]

---

1 ACFID Resolution 1-2022 – Decolonisation, Anti-Racism and Locally Led Action. https://acfid.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/ACFID-Resolution-1-2022-Decolonisation-and-Locally-Led-Action.pdf

2 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Preventing sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment. https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/preventing-sexual-exploitation-abuse-and-harassment
ACFID. ACFID Releases Guidance for the Development of a Prevention of Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment Policy. https://acfid.asn.au/acfid-releases-guidance-for-the-development-of-a-disability-inclusion-policy-3-24
ACFID. PSEA Changes 2019. https://acfid.asn.au/good-practice-toolkit/psea-changes-2019

The humanitarian system and the diverse entities that engage with the system to deliver assistance and protection are facing dynamic dilemmas and opportunities. To meet these challenges, humanitarian, military and police actors, and the relationships between them, are evolving. This includes how coordination between civilians, military and police happens when preparing and responding to disasters and complex emergencies.

While humanitarian, military and police actors increasingly operate in proximity to each other or, where appropriate, partner together when responding to crisis situations, there is also a shared recognition that this must be in support of local authorities. These situations can be the result of many factors including disease outbreaks, natural or human-induced hazards, protracted crisis, or armed conflict.

This guide clarifies how these actors are distinguished from one another, where they may have similarities and/or complementarities, and what principles influence their engagement with others.

While this guide is produced by the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) and the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), it is relevant to operations globally. The primary target audiences are Australian stakeholders involved in responding to international disasters and complex emergencies, Indo-Pacific stakeholders, and the wider international civil-military-police community.

This guide aims to:

- highlight the shifts that the localisation agenda has led to in crisis response
- provide an overview of military, police, government agencies, humanitarian organisations and civil society and their responses to disasters and complex emergencies,[3] including pandemics

3 The IASC defines a complex emergency as 'a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme'. Source: IASC 2008. *Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies*, UN OCHA, New York, p. 11. https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/partners/partners/3ba88e7c6/coordination-complex-emergencies.html

- clarify key terminology used within these contexts to help create understanding and effective communication
- highlight the complexities, challenges, limitations and opportunities of engagement between the stakeholders within the civil-military-police dimension
- share key considerations for working with civil society and promoting locally led principled humanitarian response
- increase understanding and use of the major agreed civil-military guidelines
- provide a set of key references and publications to help further inform all stakeholders.

Since this guide was first published in 2012, countries and humanitarian organisations have committed to ensuring that humanitarian response is more locally led by signing up to the Grand Bargain.[4] This has implications for how humanitarian actors work together and with local and affected communities, as well as how military and police engage. This updated version provides guidance on this emerging priority.

There has also been a significant increase in the scale of humanitarian need, which has led to more interaction between police, military and humanitarian actors. The number of people recognised by the United Nations Global Humanitarian Overview as requiring humanitarian assistance and protection rose by over 70% in the four years between 2018 and 2021, peaking in 2020 with nearly 440 million people in need.[5] Figure 1 shows the number of people in need against the number of people targeted for assistance between 2018 and 2021.

4 This will be explained further in Chapter 3.

5 UN OCHA 2022. Global Humanitarian Overview. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2022?_gl=1*1rvxrp6*_ga*MTAzMzI0OTAzMS4xNjY1NjEyODc5*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTY2NTYxMjg3OS4xLjEuMTY2NTYxMjg5OS40MC4wLjA

Figure 1: Numbers of people in need and targeted for assistance, 2018–2021[6]



In December 2021, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) predicted that a total of 274 million people would need humanitarian assistance in 2022. However, a Global Humanitarian Overview update by OCHA recorded that there were already 309.7 million people in need as of 30 September 2022. The unexpectedly high number was largely caused by the war in Ukraine, rising food insecurity, and devastating flooding in Pakistan.

The COVID-19 pandemic, protracted crises and climate change are among the most significant contributing factors in the increasing need for humanitarian assistance. The pandemic drastically altered the scale and geography of humanitarian need – and the capacity of economies to support populations at home and abroad. Extreme climate events have increased population displacement, and conflict remains a major driver of humanitarian need.

Intra and inter-state conflicts continue to generate complex emergencies resulting in significant humanitarian and development challenges, including population displacement, breakdown of governance structures and the rule of law, human rights violations, and insecurity. Violent conflicts are

6 Source: OCHA Global Humanitarian Overview, 2018–2021. Note: These figures include all UN-coordinated appeals covered under the Global Humanitarian Overview, including refugee response plans, flash appeals, and humanitarian response plans.

significantly impacting civilians, who account for an estimated 90% of casualties when explosive weapons are used in populated areas.[7] Examples of these issues can be seen in Ukraine, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Iraq, Syria, the Sudan region and Somalia. As a result, the number of people living in forced displacement reached more than 100 million in 2022. This equates to 1 in every 78 people on earth being forced to flee, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Global Trends report.

This is the reality that all actors who respond to crises face. It is imperative to prioritise dialogue and coordination between humanitarian responders to improve the delivery of assistance and protection. We need this guide because civil-military-police coordination in times of crisis reduces duplication, ensures complementarity and, ultimately, saves lives.

7 UN OCHA 2022. Global Humanitarian Overview.

Chapter 2: Key actors in times of crisis

Humanitarian responses involve a large and diverse range of local, national and international actors working in the same space and towards the same overarching goal. This chapter goes into detail about the key actors who respond in times of crisis and how they work. As shown in Figure 2, humanitarian organisations, militaries and police are just some of the entities that may be involved. The diagram highlights the importance of understanding the unique and complementary roles of different actors and why dialogue and coordination are critical for effective principled response.

Figure 2: Entities involved in crisis response[8]



8 A Obrecht and S Swithern with J Doherty 2022. *The State of the Humanitarian System*. ALNAP. https://sohs.alnap.org/help-library/2022-the-state-of-the-humanitarian-system-sohs---full-report-0

Host country

The host country,[9] where the disaster or complex emergency occurs, has responsibility and authority for providing and coordinating assistance within its territory. In general, there will be no international response unless the host country makes a request or accepts an offer. This fact highlights the importance of working with host governments, including their disaster management offices.

Most countries have established a national agency responsible for disaster management, reinforcing the principle that disaster management is a national responsibility. In Australia this is the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). These agencies, sometimes referred to as natural disaster management offices (NDMOs), are the key coordinating agencies for various government and non-governmental agencies for disaster preparedness and management.

However, in situations where a host country's national authorities are engaged in armed conflict or violence within the country, it may be difficult for humanitarian agencies to work alongside or cooperate with the national authorities without compromising the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality or operational independence. These principles are presented in more detail in Chapter 3.

In addition to national authorities, foreign military or police and the humanitarian community are likely to encounter other important and influential stakeholders in the host country. These stakeholders include local civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the United Nations (UN) agencies, private sector companies, and non-stated armed groups.

Local community and civil society

It is not just large institutions – civil, military or humanitarian – that are key players in the response to a disaster or complex emergency. There is now greater recognition of the roles of local civil society groups, networks and

9 The host country is sometimes referred to as the 'host nation/region', the 'affected state/region', the 'affected nation' or the 'partner country'.

consortia that provide services, conduct advocacy, and influence the way the international humanitarian system operates. This is linked to localisation in humanitarian action, which is further explained in Chapter 3.

There are some risks to working more closely with civil society – for example, where civil society organisations (CSOs) take an activist approach or political stance on an issue. Being seen to be working with these organisations may fuel tensions and compromise perceptions of the impartiality of humanitarian actors. However, this can be mitigated by interacting with local actors within pre-prepared frameworks and forums. It is important to be mindful when engaging with local actors of influencing pre-existing power dynamics between different segments of society. For example, engaging leaders and decision-makers in patriarchal communities may miss the needs and capacities of women.

In some contexts, civil society has a fraught relationship with military and police actors due to historic abuse. This reality will shape what interaction looks like in the future. In a conflict setting or a politically charged environment, a CSO's engagement with military actors could put them at risk of being perceived as an enemy combatant. This can sometimes have fatal consequences.

Agencies and organisations involved in crisis response must understand the imperative to ensure the right people are involved in mechanisms that share information, assess priorities, design interventions, and mobilise resources. Without the participation of the local population and civil society actors, priorities will not be fully understood or implemented.

Not all civil society actors have a formal mandate for emergency response, and some may consider this only a part of their mandate (for example, organisations for people with disabilities). Nonetheless, civil society actors and affected communities are well placed to advise on issues including information gathering and sharing, gender, disability, inclusion, status of ethnic and religious minorities, underlying grievances and sources of conflict, local resource management, traditional practices and knowledge, and so on. Incorporating these local aspects into a humanitarian response is critical to ensure that the response is implemented in a contextualised and sensitive manner and does no harm.

Access to civil society and local organisations can be arranged through NDMOs or through humanitarian and development agencies that partner with CSOs. It is widely acknowledged that CSOs and local organisations have an important role to play, but they are not always given a seat at the table in formal coordination mechanisms and meetings. This includes humanitarian civil-military-police coordination forums. All stakeholders should incorporate local civil society perspectives into formal coordination mechanisms and understand what coordination means from the local population's point of view. It is important to recognise that local and international civil society actors often have their own coordination and communication spaces.

International humanitarian system

The international humanitarian system is a network of numerous interconnected actors with varied mandates, funding, and delivery modalities. International organisations – such as UN agencies, regional organisations, and parts of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, when acting internationally – draw their mandates from international legal instruments and the host country request for support.

The term 'mandate' is used to describe the values, forms of legitimacy and missions of agencies that undertake humanitarian activities in contexts of disasters and complex emergencies. NGOs have constitutional documents defining their mission and focus. They participate in a response at the invitation or agreement of the host country.

Aside from emergency response, many humanitarian actors are involved in preparedness, disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and resilience, and recovery.

Intergovernmental organisations and forums

Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) are made up primarily of sovereign entities, for example the United Nations; the European Union and its humanitarian arm, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO); and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund (IMF). These entities plus regional IGOs and forums are increasingly active, promoting cooperation in response efforts and preparedness among member states. Development financing can be important in addressing long-term causes and effects of crises. In the Asia-Pacific region these include the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF); the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), supported by the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre); and the Asian Development Bank. In addition, humanitarian responses are supported by regional frameworks or mechanisms – for example, the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, launched in 2022, or the longstanding FRANZ agreement, which is the pre-eminent coordination mechanism between France, Australia and New Zealand for humanitarian response efforts in the Pacific region. Other regions have similar frameworks in place, like the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA).

United Nations

The UN comprises many agencies, funds and programs. Its specialised agencies include the World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Women, UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Development Programme (UNDP). United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) operate at the country level to ensure that UN programs, funds and agencies are unified and coherent. A Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) brings together UN, NGO, IGO and other humanitarian actors to work together in a cohesive manner at a country level.[10]

In a disaster response, OCHA facilitates cluster and inter-cluster coordination (see Chapter 3), information management, advocacy, policy development and humanitarian financing. OCHA has humanitarian and civil-military-police coordination functions. It assists the host government to mobilise international assistance and coordinate humanitarian action when national capacity has been exceeded.

10 Examples of these are in Chapter 3.

The UN system has two specialist civil-military coordination capabilities. These tend to be the key points of interaction for humanitarian actors with military and police.

UN OCHA – Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS)

CMCS is the 'designated focal point in the UN system for humanitarian civil-military coordination'.[11] It supports operations as well as being the custodian of the global guidance on humanitarian civil-military coordination. CMCS provides training, advice and policy input, as well as deploying people into operations and supporting OCHA offices.

World Food Programme – Humanitarian Military Interaction (HMI) Unit

HMI officers are involved in humanitarian civil-military coordination to support the implementation of WFP programs and operations. The WFP provides specific civil-military coordination training to agencies, with an emphasis on logistics.

UN peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping continues to evolve as a significant tool in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. In 2017 the rapidly shifting global landscape prompted the UN Secretary-General to launch a reform which included restructuring the Peace and Security Pillar Department into two – the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) – with a single regional structure and shared support services, as shown in Figure 3.

11 OCHA. 'Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination'. https://www.unocha.org/themes/humanitarian-civil-military-coordination

Figure 3: UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Department of Peace Operations

The DPO, formerly the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), provides the political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations and maintains contact with the UN Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates and resolutions. The DPO consists of 3 main offices: Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions; Office of Military Affairs; and Policy, Evaluation and Training Division. Currently there are 12 DPO-led peacekeeping operations deployed, as seen in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Current UN peacekeeping operations



Inter-Agency Standing Committee

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was established based on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182. It is the longest-standing and highest-level humanitarian coordination forum of the UN system and is made up of 20 organisations within and outside the United Nations. The IASC advocates for common humanitarian principles and aims to strengthen collective decision-making on humanitarian action. This includes formulating policy, setting strategic priorities, and mobilising resources in response to crises.[12]

12 IASC 2022. 'The Inter-Agency Standing Committee'. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org

The IASC is chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, whose role is to ensure preparedness for and responses to humanitarian crises. Figure 5 shows the structure of the IASC.

Figure 5: Inter-Agency Standing Committee structure[13]



* Task Forces are timebound until end 2023

** Focusing on addressing bureaucratic and administrative impediments and mitigating the impact of counter-terrorism legislation

*** The entities associated with the IASC are comprised of the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations Steering Group (IAHE-SG) as well as the following entities under consideration for transition during the course of 2022: (a) Global Cluster Coordination Group (GCCG), (b) Humanitarian Program Cycle Steering Group (HPG-SG), (c) Reference Group on Gender and Humanitarian Action (GRG), (d) Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings Reference Group (MHPSS-RG)

13 IASC. 'IASC Structure'. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-structure

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement) has three components:

- the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)[14]
- national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (national societies) in 192 countries.[15]

All three components are guided in their work by the Movement's Fundamental Principles.[16]

ICRC's mandate is to assist and protect people affected by armed conflict. It has international legal status under the Geneva Conventions of 1949.[17] ICRC is the guardian and promoter of international humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the Law of Armed Conflict.

ICRC is known for its rigorous adherence to the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality and has well-established procedures for operating in conflict zones. In armed conflict and other situations of violence, ICRC's services include protection, health services (war surgery, primary health care and orthopaedics), economic security (food, household items and livelihood support), water, sanitation and shelter.

ICRC's protection role, mandated by the Geneva Conventions, includes:

- visiting detainees (including prisoners of war) to assess the conditions of their detention and working with authorities to improve these conditions where necessary
- tracing – searching for separated or missing family members, exchanging family messages, reuniting families, and seeking to clarify the fate of those who remain missing

14 The IFRC is sometimes referred to as 'the Federation'.
15 IFRC. 'National Societies'. https://www.ifrc.org/national-societies-directory
16 Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality.
17 See http://www.icrc.org for more information on the Geneva Conventions.

- reminding the parties to a conflict of the rules governing the conduct of hostilities and the rules relating to the use of force in law enforcement operations
- acting as a neutral intermediary (providing a neutral channel or zone for achieving humanitarian outcomes) when and where requested and agreed to by national authorities or any other party involved.

ICRC coordinates and directs international assistance within the Movement in times of armed conflict.

IFRC acts as the secretariat and policy development body for member national societies. It coordinates and directs international assistance within the Movement following disasters in non-conflict situations. It works with national societies to build their capacities and respond to disasters and refugee outflows. IFRC's relief operations are conducted with and through national societies and combined with their development work in country. IFRC is also the convenor of the shelter cluster (see Chapter 3) in disasters and is the promoter of the International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) Guidelines.

National societies form the backbone of the Movement. A national society is recognised by the legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and national legislation as a voluntary aid society auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field. In this capacity, national societies support the public authorities in their humanitarian tasks, according to the needs of the people of their respective countries. Each national society is made up of members, volunteers and staff who provide a range of services. While specific programs vary by country, depending on needs and capacity, standing programs usually include first aid training, support to blood banks, restoring family links, support to vulnerable communities and the promotion of IHL.

National societies are often represented on national disaster management committees. However, as autonomous organisations, they retain their independence by adhering to the Movement's Fundamental Principles. To support the work of the Movement internationally, national societies send funds, delegates and supplies abroad during disasters or conflict situations, under the coordination of IFRC or ICRC.

Non-governmental organisations

NGOs are civilian, not-for-profit organisations. They may be international, national, or local, and some are faith based.[18] Their size, nature and intent are highly diverse, as is their willingness to work with other agencies, particularly the military. Some are part of global confederations or alliances; others may be very small unaffiliated organisations that address niche needs. In any one country, there may be just a few to thousands of NGOs present, with a range of mandates, objectives, operations, organisational structures, impacts and effectiveness. They are often referred to as civil society organisations or community-based organisations, depending on their legal status. While NGOs may have a voluntary aspect, many individuals working for them are trained professionals. According to the 2022 State of the Humanitarian System report, there were an estimated 5,000 humanitarian agencies worldwide in 2021 and the five largest international NGOs, according to expenditure, were Médecins Sans Frontières, International Rescue Committee, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children International and World Vision International.[19]

NGOs usually receive funding from private individuals and groups but may also receive some financial assistance from governments and UN agencies. NGOs are not part of a whole-of-government response, even though their funding may come in part from government. Many NGOs cap the amount of government funding they will accept; some do not accept any government funding, to ensure their independence. They are considered integral to a whole-of-society response.

Not all NGOs have a humanitarian focus. NGOs may be singularly focused or have multiple mandates. These mandates may include humanitarian assistance, development and/or advocacy. Given the NGO community's diversity and the settings in which they work, ensuring minimum standards (in whatever field an NGO might operate) is a significant challenge. To

18 Unless otherwise noted, 'NGOs' refers to both humanitarian and development NGOs.

19 A Obrecht and S Swithern with J Doherty 2022. *The State of the Humanitarian System*. ALNAP. https://sohs.alnap.org/help-library/2022-the-state-of-the-humanitarian-system-sohs-%E2%80%93-full-report-0

address this, the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) and the Sphere standards were developed. The CHS, a global standard grounded in local realities, describes the essential elements of principled, accountable and high-quality humanitarian action.[20] The Sphere standards set principles and minimum humanitarian standards in the technical areas relating to humanitarian response.

There are several NGO consortia that work to promote best practice and better coordination in humanitarian and development aid delivery. These consortia typically do not have any authority over their members. International consortia include the NEAR Network, ACFID in Australia,[21] Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE) in Europe, InterAction in the USA, and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). VOICE and ICVA serve as consortia of international NGOs and provide a range of services to their members. They also act as strong proponents of specific efforts; these normally involve increasing government foreign aid budgets and levels of awareness for specific emergencies.[22] NGOs may subscribe to a national, regional or broader international standard that defines good practice for international development organisations and represents an active commitment to conduct activities with integrity and accountability. The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, to which 817[23] organisations around the world have subscribed, provides a universal standard for humanitarian NGOs.

---

20 See also Global Standard for CSO Accountability (Global Standard – ACFID), which has been developed by nine international development partners (including ACFID). The Global Standard for CSO Accountability captures a globally shared and dynamic understanding of accountability. https://acfid.asn.au/code-of-conduct/other-standards/global-standard

21 The ACFID Code of Conduct is a voluntary, self-regulatory industry code of good practice. https://acfid.asn.au/code-of-conduct

22 Lynn Lawry (ed) 2009. *Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military*. The Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine.

23 Based on the table of signatories published on the IFRC website, there are now around 817 signatories. IFRC, 'Signatories to the Code of Conduct'. https://www.ifrc.org/code-conduct-signatories?webform_submission_value=&webform_submission_value_1=&page=18

In addition to international consortia, there are peak bodies at a regional level and in some host countries that seek to facilitate NGO coordination and advocate on behalf of the NGO community. Examples are the Pacific Islands Association of Non-governmental Organisations (PIANGO), the Timor-Leste NGO Forum (FONGTIL), and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR).

NGOs tend to work in ways that build the capacity of partners, including host governments, local organisations and local communities. Increasingly, international NGOs rely more on partnerships with host country organisations and groups and less on international staff to implement humanitarian responses. NGOs work with communities to increase resilience, reduce vulnerabilities, increase capacities, and promote sustainable and enduring development.

In line with the localisation agenda (see Chapter 3), many NGOs emphasise the importance of local ownership and empowerment. These NGOs strive to design and implement programs that reduce the vulnerability of the host nation's population and reduce the risk of future disasters. They emphasise sustainability, working to assist communities to overcome poverty and injustice over the long term. Within the NGO mandate, it is not just *what* is done but *how* it is done that informs their engagement, and NGOs believe this is critical to their long-term success.

NGOs are **not** part of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement or government agencies.

Government agencies

Increasingly governments are adopting a multiagency or whole-of-government approach to a crisis response or complex emergency that integrates government resources and personnel. This whole-of-government approach ensures a variety of experts and technical resources can be called upon to address the complex set of tasks that may be encountered.

Foreign offices and ministries

Foreign offices and ministries often oversee their government's response to international disasters or complex emergencies. They are responsible for coordinating whole-of-government advice to executive and legislative arms of government on response options. This involves chairing interdepartmental committees, task forces or other groups that are set up to coordinate a government's response across agencies. Foreign offices and ministries are often involved in assisting vulnerable countries to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from conflicts and disasters.

If a responding government has a foreign mission (such as an embassy or High Commission) in the host country, the head of mission is responsible for overseeing the government's official liaison with local leadership and all aspects of its response in country, including consular and humanitarian efforts. Foreign offices and ministries provide strategic direction, coordination and oversight of mission activities, engage with local leaders (official and unofficial) to influence political processes, undertake public advocacy in support of mission objectives, and facilitate regional or international cooperation.

Agencies for international development (donors)

Many governments have agencies or programs for coordinating the humanitarian and development components of their government's response to disasters and crises in developing countries. These agencies may sit outside or within ministries or departments of foreign affairs. For example, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has managed Australia's international aid program since 2013. It takes the lead in Australia's crisis response efforts. This includes facilitating regional and international cooperation around the crisis response and ensuring Australia's response efforts are focused on supporting the needs of the host country's people and the host government's disaster management priorities.

Government agencies and programs provide humanitarian assistance at the host country's request. This request is relayed to the assisting government through normal diplomatic processes. The assisting agency or program then

develops a course of action to deliver appropriate and effective assistance. This can include:

- contributing funds to trusted international and local partners with local capability and specialist knowledge to deliver emergency relief assistance on the ground
- providing relief supplies to meet affected communities' urgent needs
- deploying experts and specialist teams with required skills, including through standing arrangements with other government agencies
- deploying military forces to provide surge capacity in emergency response.

The term 'donor' is commonly used for agencies or organisations that provide funding to other entities to undertake humanitarian and/or development work on their behalf. In this guide, 'donor' refers to government agencies that provide funding for humanitarian and development activities, and strategic policy that underpins the government's overseas aid and development portfolio. Donors may fund IGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, private contractors, and regional organisations.

Governments that provide funding to the humanitarian community as donors generally understand and support their humanitarian partners' efforts to maintain their neutrality in humanitarian response. At the same time, it is acknowledged that other political objectives may influence government responses. Box 1 outlines guidance that supports principled and effective donor roles in humanitarian action.

Box 1 – Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles

The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, supported by 42 countries, recognises that by working together donors can more effectively encourage and stimulate principled donor behaviour and, by extension, improve humanitarian action. There are now 24 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, which provide a framework to guide official humanitarian aid and a mechanism to encourage greater donor accountability. Principles 19 and 20 specifically focus on humanitarian civil-military coordination:

19. Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, ensure that such use is in conformity with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.

20. Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

Military

Where affected states request, welcome or accept international assistance, foreign military assets (FMA) are increasingly utilised in response operations. Foreign military may deploy on the basis of bilateral agreements such as a status of forces agreement (SOFA) or multilateral agreements between governments.

Humanitarian activities and disaster relief are not primary functions of many militaries. However, militaries have capacity to perform such operations and may be requested to do so domestically and internationally. Their unique capabilities can complement an overall relief effort. These include proximity, speed, specialisation, efficiency and effectiveness, which enable the military to contribute directly or indirectly. Military support may include infrastructure, logistics, transport, airfield management, communications, medical support, distribution of relief commodities, and security. Many governments look to their militaries to be principal responders to domestic disasters.

Only duly authorised military commanders can command military personnel and capabilities. Therefore, when considering options for military support to civil crisis response, civilian authorities and agencies should consider asking for military assistance based on an effect, such as delivery of food and water to an affected community, rather than requesting specific military assets, such as a ship. Within their scope of authority, legal considerations and available capabilities, the military commander will determine what available military assets or tasks, if any, are suitable to achieve the desired result.

The capabilities of a military force differ from country to country. However, some commonalities are:

- employing a hierarchical command structure to enable the control of many tasks or functions over a wide geographical area or span of responsibility
- using assumption-based planning to enable troops and assets to be moved to where they will be required before all the facts are known
- maintaining communications and reporting lines, particularly to the higher headquarters, enabling confirmation of facts from those on the ground and informing further planning.

Foreign and domestic militaries respond to and engage with humanitarian efforts differently. Domestic militaries have a sovereign right to operate and are usually assigned specific tasks within their government's response framework/plan. When foreign military forces respond to an international disaster or complex emergency, it is generally at the express invitation of the host country and in strict accordance with the host country's priorities. This necessitates close interaction and communication with host country authorities. Foreign military deployments add to the burden on domestic militaries, as they are generally responsible for coordinating, receiving, staging and integrating foreign military assets as they arrive (often with very little advance notice). This is in addition to their first responder roles domestically.

The focus of any international disaster response is to save human life, alleviate suffering and foster recovery efforts. To achieve this, the military forces will work in cooperation with the host country government, establish

contact with key stakeholders within the local population and support the community of responders. The military's role in a response is to carry out high-impact, short-duration assistance and relief operations. The aim of these operations is to establish conditions enabling effective ongoing delivery of relief provisions by specialist government and non-government providers. Operational experience has shown that the IGOs and NGOs in host countries are in place before any deployed domestic or foreign military resources arrive and will remain long after the military has left. Accordingly, a key goal will be to seek areas of cooperation between the military force, the host country, and IGO and NGO providers.

Military forces are directed and are accountable to their elected civilian governments. In general, the military role is to support and enable efforts to relieve emergency needs until traditional disaster-management capacities no longer require military support. Under all but exceptional circumstances, foreign military forces will be deployed in support of disaster relief efforts and will not assume leadership of the overall effort. This does not preclude supporting civil command and control.

In a complex emergency, the military's role may initially focus on security operations, which will have a higher priority in the military mission. This is often the case in peace operations missions. However, militaries may be involved in a wider spectrum of activities directed towards population support (e.g., restoration of basic services such as health facilities) and capacity building. In some circumstances, these activities may present a challenge to the neutrality and independence of humanitarian organisations, both in perception and in reality.

Deploying military forces into complex emergencies requires a legal basis under international law. In the case of UN peacekeepers, the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It determines when deploying a UN peacekeeping operation is appropriate, and will formally authorise the mission by adopting a resolution detailing the operation's mandate, size and detailed tasks. This can include invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter when authorising the deployment of UN peacekeepers into volatile post-conflict settings where the state is unable to main security and public order.

In complex emergencies, there is a heightened imperative for military forces to gain a detailed understanding of the political dynamics within their operating area, including friendly, neutral, and adversarial groups. Population support is central to enabling a successful transition from conflict to a political settlement and setting the groundwork for sustainable social and economic development. A key goal of military forces in this context will be to minimise the impact of military operations on the local population.

Over the course of an extended commitment, the size and range of deployed military capabilities may change in response to the changing operating environment, revised assisting government guidance, changes in host nation requests, or changes in international mandates. Militaries should, wherever possible, make maximum use of established infrastructure and civilian capacity to avoid becoming a resource on which other responding agencies become reliant. Such reliance creates the potential for longer term dependency and can make it more difficult for donor states to redeploy their military forces.

On deployment the military force will establish contact with host country stakeholders, the United Nations Country Team (UN HCT) if present, and other stakeholders to understand the host country, IGO and NGO structures in place. The military may deploy a civil-military cooperation team to support these interactions. In some operational environments, the military may establish a civil-military operations centre (CMOC) as a place where IGOs and NGOs can meet with the military and exchange information. This centre will be positioned away from the military operating facilities if conditions allow. A CMOC aims to bring together stakeholders to plan as well as to deconflict and inform. A CMOC is most appropriate when the military is the lead agency for specific programs or an area. The CMOC staff may include interagency personnel. Military civil affairs capabilities have recovery and development specialists that can support CMOC operations with less interagency support.

A military-led operations centre is not a preferred humanitarian or recovery coordination forum. If a military-led operations centre is initiated, there should be a plan for transition of responsibility to civilian-led coordination as early as the security situation and supported Humanitarian Coordinator capacity allows.

Even if a foreign military is fulfilling or supporting humanitarian tasks, the military is a tool of the foreign policy of a government, and as such is not perceived as neutral or impartial. In undertaking humanitarian and related tasks, militaries should represent themselves accurately and transparently to local communities, particularly the people affected. They should avoid being misperceived as principled humanitarian actors.[24]

Police

There are various models of policing worldwide, each of which has evolved due to a range of historical and political factors. Some countries have a highly decentralised model with different police forces operating at the local, state/provincial and national levels. Other countries have a single national police force. Historical, political and legal factors inform whether police act in a community policing or a paramilitary role. Policing around the world varies depending on:

- whether the police are accountable to a local or national authority
- how they are structured – whether they operate nationally or in a decentralised model
- their legal powers and how their use of force is regulated
- to what extent they are accountable to their community and their governance institutions.

Although many police and defence forces look similar, with their uniforms, hierarchical rank and command structure, there are often significant differences. The police mandate is to keep the peace and enforce criminal law, with protection of life and property as their primary function. In liberal democracies this relies on public consent. Military forces have an entirely different institutional outlook, role and approach.

24 UN OCHA 2014. *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: A Guide for the Military*, p. 13.

It is critical to note that even though police are civilians (this is explored further in Chapter 3), they are not humanitarian agencies but government entities that cannot be bound to be independent, neutral or impartial.

When deployed internationally, police can take on several roles including executive policing, advisory, training and operational support. Their activities include maintaining order and controlling crime through deterrence and the provision of social services (e.g., working with youth groups, women's groups and neighbourhood watch groups).

When nations deploy their police to UN peace operations and other missions, there must be a legal foundation for their deployment, as with military forces – for example, a request from a host government or authorisation by a UN Security Council resolution. Depending on the mandate given by the UN Security Council, the UN Police build and support host-state police capacity or act as a substitute or partial substitute, in adherence to the rule of law and international human rights laws. UN policing also can contribute to stabilisation and recovery efforts, as well as the extension or restoration of state authority. Deployments can be either as formed police units or as individual police officers.

The activities that police can perform while deployed are underpinned by the following caveats:

- Internationally deployed police are outside their jurisdictional sovereignty.
- No automatic authority or mandate exists for deployed police to exercise executive policing powers in a host country.

Deployed police are usually civilians and have non-combatant status. They are generally trained to use the minimum force necessary to perform their law enforcement functions, using lethal force in extremely limited circumstances, in accordance with applicable law and mandate. Given that, negotiation and conflict management are core components of police training. Specific authorisation is needed for police to carry weapons on overseas deployments. Police are empowered legally and organisationally to exercise autonomous responsibility at all levels, with accountability through legal and governance institutions such as the courts and the government.

Police, unlike the military, are usually civilians and have non-combatant status under international law.

Box 2 presents a case study of an Australian Federal Police (AFP) deployment.

Box 2 – An Australian case study: Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was a police-led mission, established in 2003 at the invitation of the Solomon Islands (SI) government. RAMSI sought to address outstanding challenges facing SI, including civil unrest and lawlessness, economic decline and stagnation, and a deterioration in government standards. Australia led RAMSI in cooperation with New Zealand and 13 Pacific nations (known as the Participating Police Force – PPF). The PPF ensured that RAMSI pursued 'Pacific-style solutions for Pacific-style challenges' through cooperation and coordination.

RAMSI was mobilised and legitimised under the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Biketawa Declaration and reported to PIF members directly. From the outset, RAMSI was a police-led mission, with the PPF in the lead rather than the military. The PPF worked alongside the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) to rebuild its policing capacity and response capability. The prominence of policing in RAMSI reflected broader international thinking about the importance of effective domestic security capabilities as a critical precondition for achieving long-term stability and development.

RAMSI provided a valuable model for improving relationships between the military and police and demonstrated that the two forces can be complementary rather than competitive. A military Combined Task Force (CTF) (comprising Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Fiji) was tasked with undertaking protection and security duties on a standby basis to the humanitarian community, and logistics and transport support throughout SI. The CTF and PPF always acted in cooperation with one another.

RAMSI successfully used joint training activities and a community outreach program to create strong working relationships across the police and military forces.

RAMSI pursued an integrated, whole-of-government approach to coordinating its three groups: police, military, and civilian advisers. This was fused by a six-week joint planning exercise in Canberra before deployment, frequent coordination meetings using a single

reporting system, and speaking with one voice to the government and people of SI. This cooperative approach continued for the duration of the mission, until its conclusion in 2017.

Localisation and institutionalisation of RAMSI assisted the mission in building confidence and trust within the SI community. RAMSI relied on CSOs and NGOs to communicate the purpose of changes and rules it implemented. For example, upon arrival in SI, RAMSI announced a nationwide firearms amnesty due to the high rates of gun violence and the need to disarm the active militant groups. The Melanesia Brotherhood, an Anglican group, was essential in implementing this decision as it had a trusted presence and platform within the community.

Ongoing support

The Solomon Islands Police Development Program (SIPDP) was established post-RAMSI as the successor police capacity development program. Skilled AFP officers delivered training, mentoring (including on gender-focused activities) and selected operational resourcing to support the ability of the RSIPF to transition from the RAMSI era to independently providing policing services across SI. In 2021 the RSIPF and AFP Policing Partnership Program (RAPPP) commenced, focusing on technical and operational enabling assistance to support the RSIPF in its operational delivery of policing services.

Non-state armed groups

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) are organised non-state parties to armed conflict. Often they fight against states, but they may also fight against other NSAGs. In some cases, they have the support or patronage of (but are not controlled by or part of) a state. NSAGs are diverse: they have varying goals, structures, doctrines, funding sources, military capacity, and degree of territorial control.[25] Some are 'state-like', administering territory in a manner akin to that of a state. Others are comparatively small, clandestine and/or transient. NSAGs have the capacity to directly influence the security and humanitarian environment, including by facilitating, providing, impeding or withholding services to people under their control.

25 Teresa Whitfield 2010. *Engaging with Armed Groups: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators*. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/mediation-practice-series-engaging-armed-groups-dilemmas-options-mediators

All NSAGs and their members are bound by domestic law. NSAGs also have international legal obligations and protections, particularly under IHL. Indeed, NSAGs have the same IHL obligations as states. Among many other things, NSAGs must treat people taking no active part in hostilities humanely and allow and facilitate impartial humanitarian activities, including relief schemes.[26]

Humanitarian actors routinely engage with NSAGs to build respect for relevant law and standards, to influence their behaviour and to obtain or preserve 'acceptance' (see Chapter 5) and humanitarian access. Such work is expressly foreseen by IHL. It should not be prohibited by domestic law, and should be allowed and facilitated. It is important to note that neither IHL nor humanitarian engagement confers any legitimacy on armed groups or gives them any legal status whatsoever.

The private sector

The term 'private sector' in this guide refers to domestic and international for-profit companies, business and managing contractors; it excludes NGOs and not-for-profit organisations. The private sector has long been a significant contributor to humanitarian action. It is becoming increasingly recognised as a major stakeholder in disaster response and complex emergencies.

Domestic companies in a country affected by a crisis can bring important local knowledge and resources that can improve humanitarian response. This includes not only cash and in-kind provision of food and other essentials but also supply chains and political influence.

The private sector has a vital interest in minimising disruption to economic activity caused by disasters, such as damage to assets, disruption to supply chains, and the displacement of the workforce. As a result most companies take partnerships with humanitarian actors seriously. To achieve effective

26 Notably, NSAGs are bound by Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which regulates non-international armed conflicts. See the updated Commentary on the Geneva Conventions, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp

humanitarian impact, it is important that the private sector adheres to the World Economic Forum (WEF) Guiding Principles for Public-Private Collaboration for Humanitarian Action.[27]

Box 3: Guiding Principles for Public-Private Collaboration for Humanitarian Action (WEF and OCHA)

1. Leveraging of core competencies
2. Needs driven
3. Standards and codes of conduct
4. Relationships with government
5. Building local capacity
6. Donation cost coverage
7. Distinction between humanitarian and commercial activities
8. Public relations
9. Reporting, monitoring and evaluation
10. Predictability

Private sector entities involved in humanitarian action vary in size and scale, ranging from international to national and subnational levels. This includes managing contractors which implement donor programs in developing countries on behalf of governments or other private sector entities. Companies such as Alinea International, Tetra Tech, Palladium, and Abt Associates are examples of managing contractors.

Private military and security companies

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are private business entities that provide military and/or security services. Military and security services include armed guarding and protecting people and objects such as

27 WEF UN OCHA. *Guiding Principles for Public-Private Collaboration for Humanitarian Action*. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/World%20Economic%20Forum%20-%20OCHA%20Guiding%20Principles%20for%20Public-Private%20Collaboration%20in%20Humanitarian%20Action.pdf

convoys, buildings, and other places; maintaining and operating weapons systems; managing and running detention facilities; and advising or training local forces and security personnel.

The Montreux Document is an intergovernmental document intended to promote respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law where PMSCs are present in armed conflict[28]. While not legally binding, it reaffirms states' obligations to ensure that PMSCs working in armed conflicts comply with these laws.

Working in the same space as PMSCs can cause concerns for the humanitarian community, government agencies, the military and police, as there are no formal channels for communication or mechanisms for coordination with them. This concern creates confusion and challenges for other stakeholders, including the host country. While PMSCs have obligations under IHL, and states have obligations for their management under the Montreux Document, there may still be limited oversight of their activities.

28 ICRC 2020. The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0996-montreux-document-private-military-and-security-companies

Chapter 3: Mandates, missions and concepts

We all use concepts that are critical to our understanding of the specific work we do. These concepts reflect the values we hold and inform the structures and processes through which we act. As the first step towards mutual understanding, this chapter presents mandates, missions and several foundational concepts. While the discussion is not exhaustive, it highlights the importance of gaining a shared understanding.

This guide uses some key terms that are often contested or have inconsistent interpretation, or that are used by a limited number of actors in the civil-military-police space and thus are unfamiliar to many stakeholders. The definitions provided in this chapter are based on international and/or accepted standard references and documents.

Table 1 summarises the mandates of the three key groups.

Table 1: Humanitarian, military and police mandates

Different mandates	
Humanitarian	Humanitarian agencies are civilian in nature and work to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.
Military	The primary role of the military is to defend the state and its interests.
Police	Police are civilian in nature and their mandate is to keep the peace and enforce criminal law, with protection of life and property as their primary function.

It is helpful to understand that different types of actors can be classified as 'civilian'. Police are generally classified as civilian, as are governments and humanitarian agencies. These classifications are depicted in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Understanding civil-military actors



Civil-military-police coordination

The concept of civil-military-police coordination has different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. Because police are generally classified as civilian, the term 'civil-military coordination' (CMCoord) is more commonly used. The United Nations (specifically OCHA) uses the term 'UN Humanitarian CMCoord' to describe the civil-military-police relationship in natural disasters and complex emergencies. This relationship is defined as:

> **UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination:** The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.[29]

29 OCHA definition. https://www.unocha.org/themes/humanitarian-civil-militarycoordination

While many in the humanitarian community outside the United Nations subscribe to this approach, some do not and have instead developed their own approaches, policy and related doctrine.[30]

The matrix shown in Figure 7 presents the general understanding of basic strategies for CMCoord in peacetime and in a complex emergency. Figure 8 further illustrates these strategies in a continuum.

Figure 7: Civil-military coordination strategies

Basic Strategies for CMCoord

	Peacetime (Disaster Preparedness and Response)	Complex Emergency (including internal disturbances and tensions)
Context		
CMCoord strategy	Cooperation	Co-existence
CMCoord liaison approaches	Co-location, Liaison exchange	Liaison exchange, Liaison visit, Interlocuter
Coordination Platforms	e.g. Humanitarian-Military Operational Coordination Cell	e.g. CMCoord Cell/Advisory Group, Humanitarian Access Working Group
Key activities (as appropriate)	In a situation of cooperation, CMCoord focuses on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts: ■ In support of affected government ■ Information sharing, task division and planning ■ Appropriate use of available military assets (national and bilaterally deployed) to support humanitarian priorities and capacity gaps through the clusters ■ Documentation & reporting + others	In a situation of co-existence, CMCoord focuses on minimising competition and de-confliction: ■ Information sharing for common situational awareness on humanitarian activities/safety and security etc. ■ Humanitarian notification systems ■ Coherent & consistent use/non-use of armed escorts strategy ■ Coherent & consistent approach in using military assets (including UN Mission assets) to support humanitarian activities ■ Contribute to other critical areas of coordination like access and PoC

30 See, for example, Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response (SCHR) 2010, Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations, SCHR, Geneva.

Figure 8: The civil-military relationship



Civil-military cooperation

The term most widely used by militaries, especially in the Western military community, is 'civil-military cooperation' (CIMIC). Generally the military only uses the term 'civil-military' and does not include police in its concept of CIMIC. Note that the purpose of CIMIC is to support military objectives. The NATO definition is:

> CIMIC is a military joint function that integrates the understanding of the civil factors of the operating environment and that enables, facilitates and conducts civil-military interaction, to support the accomplishment of missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime, crisis and conflict.[31]

31 CIMIC. 'The New Definition of CIMIC and Its Transition into Doctrine Development'. CIMIC Messenger 2022–12. https://www.cimic-coe.org/publications/ccoe-publications/CIMIC_Messenger/cimic-messenger-2022-12

Civil-military interaction

The Australian Defence Force describes civil-military interaction (CMI) as:

> communication and activities between civilian and military actors in preparation for, and during, operations to establish relationships that contribute to their respective missions.[32]

Civil affairs

The term 'civil affairs' (CA) is predominantly used by the US military to denote component forces and units organised, trained and equipped specifically to:

- conduct activities that improve the relationship between military forces and civil authorities
- support civil-military operations.

CA activities involve the application of functional specialist skills in areas that are normally the responsibility of civil government.

Civil-military relations

The term 'civil-military relations' (CMR) is often used to refer to the relationship between militaries and other government bureaucracies.

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement uses the term to describe a coordination mechanism that is like CMCoord but is between the host/affected country RCRC national society (supported by the IFRC and the ICRC) and its own domestic military, police or other national security services.

Do no harm

Do no harm is a core principle underpinning all humanitarian action and civil-military engagement. The principle obliges humanitarian actors to prevent and mitigate any negative impact of their actions on affected populations. Similarly, 'do no harm' means that all humanitarian civil-

32 ADF-I-3 Civil-Military Interaction, Edition 1, 2022.

military-police coordination activities will not knowingly contribute to further conflict or harm or endanger recipients of humanitarian assistance or other affected populations.

It is important to be aware that assistance, particularly in conflict settings, can have significant unintended consequences. While it can help to reduce tensions and strengthen people's capacities to disengage from fighting and find peaceful options for solving problems, it can also reinforce, exacerbate and prolong conflict.[33] The Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) encourages actors to 'identify and act upon, potential or actual, unintended negative effects in a timely and systematic manner'.[34] This applies not only to the assistance provided but also to the conduct of the people providing the assistance. The prevention of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (PSEAH) is a critical part of any humanitarian response – for civilians, for police and for militaries.[35]

'Do no harm' also links to the emerging area of environmental protection in emergency response, which is explored in Chapter 4.

Protection of civilians

A key function of humanitarian civil-military-police coordination during times of conflict is to ensure the safety of people threatened by harm. All parties to armed conflicts are responsible for ensuring that the civilian population is protected. Essential elements of effective protection of civilians are:

- guaranteeing compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, and promoting accountability for violations of these laws
- ensuring protection through UN peacekeeping and other missions, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
- providing humanitarian access

33 Mary B Anderson 1999. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

34 Core Humanitarian Standard. https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/the-standard

35 CHS Alliance. 'PSEAH'. https://www.chsalliance.org/protection-from-sexual-exploitation-abuse-and-sexual-harassment

- delivering protection specifically to those who are most vulnerable, such as women and children during armed conflicts.[36]

Despite a growing understanding of relevant concepts and practices, the terminology of protection of civilians (PoC) remains at times inconsistent or misunderstood.

At the centre of coordination efforts is inclusion – the focus on leaving no-one behind. Figure 9 demonstrates just some of the groups who can be marginalised during times of crisis. Effective coordination seeks to address their reality.

Figure 9: Examples of marginalised groups

36 Global Protection Cluster. https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org

International humanitarian law (IHL) informs parties to a conflict of the basic rules[37] underpinning PoC. These are:

Distinction: Parties to a conflict must distinguish between civilians and combatants in order to spare the civilian population and civilian property. Civilians are entitled to respect for their lives and for their physical and moral integrity and must be protected and treated with humanity. Attacks may be made only against military objectives.

Proportionality: Attacks against combatants or military objectives must comply with the proportionality rule. Any attack that is likely to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited. This means that parties to conflict must conduct an advance assessment and only attack if the assessment indicates that civilian losses are not expected to outweigh the foreseen military advantage.

Precaution: Parties to conflict must take constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects when carrying out operations. An attacking party must take all feasible measures to ensure that the targets are military objectives. In all but exceptional circumstances they must give effective warning of attacks that may affect the civilian population. Parties to conflict must also take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects under their control against the effects of an attack – for example, military objectives must not be situated in the vicinity of civilian populations.

Unnecessary suffering: The use of weapons, projectiles or methods of warfare that are likely to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited under IHL. This prohibition is directed specifically to the protection of combatants. Certain weapons are forbidden because they harm combatants in unacceptable ways. This rule is widely accepted, although there is disagreement about the correct way to determine whether weapons cause such injury. In recent years, specific treaty regimes have prohibited the use of weapons which cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, including land mines, chemical weapons, and blinding lasers.

37 Australian Red Cross 2022. *The International Humanitarian Law Handbook for Australian Government Officials*.

Military perspective

Within the military context, PoC is primarily viewed in terms of military activities, including an armed response, to ensure the physical protection of people under imminent threat of violence. UN peacekeepers with a PoC mandate have the authority and responsibility to provide protection within their capabilities and areas of deployment where the government is unable or unwilling to protect civilians.

Where military actors have a protection mandate, humanitarian actors may share information with the military on threats against civilians, advocate with the military to increase security for civilians, and respond to requests from the military for information on population movements and humanitarian needs. See the 'Information sharing' section later in this chapter.

Militaries also engage in 'civilian harm mitigation', which refers to militaries' approaches to mitigating the adverse effects of their own targeting practices and military operations.[38] There are efforts to track civilian harm and make reparations.[39]

Police perspective

For the police, PoC encompasses activities aimed at securing full respect for the rights of individuals, applying the rule of law, and the physical protection of people under imminent threat of violence, with a focus on including women and girls.

---

38 GS Corn and P Margulies, 7 September 2022. 'The New Defense Department Plan to Curb Civilian Harm: A Bold Blueprint for Change'. Lawfare. https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-defense-department-plan-curb-civilian-harm-bold-blueprint-change?fbclid=IwAR10K-OPIfjl9JRwz4mFpvMVuGO-CvA2llxWSohSHTSCeICXFu6z8pInVU0

39 K MacLachlan, 17 June 2022. 'Protection of Civilians: A Constant in the Changing Security Environment'. NATO Review. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/06/17/protection-of-civilians-a-constant-in-the-changing-security-environment/index.html

Humanitarian perspective

The IASC defines PoC as:

> all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e., International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Refugee law (IRL)).[40]

Several humanitarian agencies have protection mandates or specific roles concerning vulnerable groups, including child protection and combating gender-based violence.

Integration of a gender perspective and the different experiences of women and girls compared to those of men and boys is a fundamental component of protection programs. Protection activities aim to create an environment where human dignity is respected and to prevent, reduce or mitigate the impact of violence, coercion, deprivation or abuse towards individuals or groups. Protection activities also seek to increase people's capacity to cope with these threats and vulnerabilities while restoring dignified conditions of life.

PoC is related to, but distinct from, humanitarian protection and responsibility to protect (R2P) as described in Table 2.

40 Baptiste Martin 2021. 'Protection and Protection of Civilians: Towards a Shared Understanding'. https://humanitarianencyclopedia.org/expertise-note/protection-and-the-protection-of-civilians-towards-a-shared-understanding

Table 2: Humanitarian protection, responsibility to protect, and protection of civilians[41]

	Humanitarian Protection	Responsibility to Protect (R2P)	Protection of Civilians
Definition	Activities carried out by humanitarian organisations to protect the fundamental well-being of affected populations. These activities are firmly guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.	Globally agreed principle that states and the international community have responsibilities in protecting civilian populations from the four mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.	All activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of civilians in accordance with the law, including human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international refugee law.
Applicability	In and out of conflict, including disasters and other emergencies.	To populations (civilians and combatants) experiencing or at risk of the four mass atrocity crimes.	To violations against civilians in situations of armed conflict and other violence.

Security

This concept has multiple meanings depending on context and stakeholder.

Military perspective

Security generally refers to protection of people, information, materiel, activities and installations from attack, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

Police perspective

Security in a policing context is concerned with the safety of the general populace of a country or community. Security can include the preservation of life and people's freedom to pursue their livelihood.

41 ACMC and Humanitarian Advisory Group 2020. *From Principle to Practice: Protecting Civilians in Violent Contexts: A Field Handbook*. https://humanitarianadvisorygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ACMC_POC_Manualv22.pdf

Humanitarian perspective

Security for the humanitarian community is often looked at in relation to humanitarian assistance and framed within the construct of 'human security', looking at issues such as physical and economic access to food (food security), minimum protection from disease and unhealthy lifestyles (health security), and protection of people from physical violence (personal security).

Security also relates to issues around the degree of access to affected populations and the degree of threat to those who provide assistance. Security in the face of physical threat is a primary consideration in determining the nature and degree of interaction between the humanitarian community and military forces. The humanitarian community's physical security framework remains rooted in the concepts of acceptance, protection and deterrence (see Chapter 5).

The humanitarian imperative

The humanitarian imperative is a core value that guides activities undertaken by the humanitarian community. It refers to the idea that the right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle that should apply to all people. The humanitarian community recognises its obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. When this aid is given, it is not a partisan or political act; the prime motivation of the humanitarian imperative is to save lives and alleviate human suffering of those most in need.

Humanitarian principles

To realise the humanitarian imperative, humanitarian agencies share and adhere to core humanitarian principles that underpin their activities. These principles are translated into practical measures to secure access to those in need, deliver effective humanitarian action and protect staff from harm.

The core humanitarian principles are described in Box 4.

Box 4 – Core humanitarian principles

The four core humanitarian principles originated from the seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and from recognition of the role of humanitarian agencies in international humanitarian law (IHL), which governs the conduct of armed conflict. These four principles have been enshrined in United Nations General Assembly resolutions.

- Humanity: To save and protect life and dignity and prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found.
- Impartiality: Help that is based solely on need and prioritises the most urgent cases. Assistance provided will not discriminate on the basis of gender identity, race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, political affiliation, sexual orientation or social status.
- Independence: Humanitarian aid activities will be implemented separately from political, military, commercial or other objectives.
- Neutrality: Assistance must be provided without taking sides in controversy that is of a political, military, religious or ideological nature. (Some agencies do not consider neutrality a core principle due to the nature of their advocacy work.)

Humanitarian space

Humanitarian space relates not only to a physical environment but more broadly to principles, codes of conduct and ways of working that apply to the provision of humanitarian assistance. To ensure core humanitarian principles are upheld, the humanitarian community should have access to all vulnerable people in all areas and be free to negotiate such access with all parties to a conflict, without fear of attack, retribution or undue pressure.

The humanitarian community also believes in the importance of maintaining a clear distinction – real or perceived – between the role and function of humanitarian actors and the role and function of a military force that is a party to the conflict. This distinction is a determining factor in creating an operating environment in which aid agencies can discharge their responsibilities effectively and safely. As a result, humanitarian actors insist on the importance of operational independence and distinction from the military, police, UN or multinational mission when delivering humanitarian assistance in a complex emergency.

Localisation

Localisation means giving ownership of development and humanitarian activities and outcomes to national and local actors that are best placed to understand and respond to the needs of their communities.

Growing in momentum since the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul, the localisation agenda is a driving force behind major changes in how responses to disasters and complex emergencies are understood, managed and led. It is essential to understand when considering civil-military-police coordination.

By its nature, localisation will look different in each country, and even within countries or programs. A true commitment to localisation means integrating equitable partnerships, quality (un-earmarked, multi-year) direct funding, transparency and accountability regarding the use of aid, and diversity and empowerment in staffing and leadership. Development and humanitarian responses are considered most ethical and effective when based on genuine, longstanding partnerships and when designed and led by local actors and organisations.

Humanitarian action should follow the maxims 'as local as possible; as international as necessary' and 'as civilian as possible; as military as necessary'. This applies at all stages of preparedness, response and recovery.

In many countries in Asia and the Pacific there is an acknowledgement that military assistance is an important component of disaster management and that military capabilities play a crucial role; however, it is equally important to acknowledge the capabilities and strengths of local humanitarian actors. They are often the first to respond to a disaster or crisis and the first to provide life-saving support to communities. Increased investment in civil society response capability is essential to strengthen and elevate the role of civil society in humanitarian assistance.

Increasing awareness of the distinct role and benefits of engaging local actors is critical. Their strengths include:

- proximity to structures and communities at national, provisional and district levels
- understanding of cultural, religious and political sensitivities
- communication skills, such as relevant languages, and access to diverse information channels
- representation of different constituencies to support inclusion.

The Grand Bargain

The Grand Bargain, agreed during the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, is a unique agreement between some of the largest donors and humanitarian organisations. It formalises their commitment to get more means into the hands of people in need and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action. To achieve this impact and measure success, two enabling priorities were agreed during the Grand Bargain five-year review in 2021:

- Reach a critical mass of quality funding that allows an effective and efficient response, ensuring visibility and accountability.
- Provide greater support for the leadership, delivery and capacity of local responders and the participation of affected communities in addressing humanitarian needs.

Figure 10 provides an overview of the Grand Bargain structure.

Figure 10: Grand Bargain structure

Key concepts in coordination

Dialogue between humanitarian, military and police actors is critical, even if the interaction results in a decision not to work together. This dialogue can take place through the appropriate CMCoord mechanism. Key issues that are discussed in this forum include humanitarian access, protection and security.

The mandate for coordination of the humanitarian response lies primarily with the affected government. UN OCHA can support this function if needed. The need for support does not subsume a legitimate authority's sovereign right to make decisions regarding the response and their partners of choice.

Figure 11: Generic international disaster coordination model



Humanitarian access

Humanitarian access refers to:

- humanitarian actors' ability to reach people affected by crisis
- the affected population's ability to access humanitarian assistance and services.[42]

Humanitarian civil-military-police coordination is particularly concerned with ensuring that crisis-affected populations have access to essential services and humanitarian assistance.

At the global and country level, OCHA facilitates and coordinates efforts to establish and maintain access. It has developed tools and mechanisms to support humanitarian advocacy and negotiations, facilitate efforts to monitor access trends and developments, and build the capacity of humanitarian partners and relevant stakeholders.

Option of last resort

Particularly from the viewpoint of UN agencies and the broader humanitarian community, the use of foreign military assets, armed escorts, joint humanitarian-military operations and other actions involving visible interaction with the military should be the option of last resort. Such actions should take place only where:

- there is no comparable civilian alternative
- the use of military support can meet a critical humanitarian need.

As detailed in Chapter 4, the Oslo Guidelines[43] suggest that foreign military and civil defence assets should only be used as a last resort.

However, the effort provided by military forces will vary in nature from country to country and often will be in support of a multiagency response.

---

42 OCHA. 'Humanitarian Access'. https://www.unocha.org/fr/themes/humanitarian-access?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIprKZyK23-wIVypVLBR03qw81EAAYASAAEgJBb_D_BwE

43 OCHA 2017. *Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief*. Revision 1.1. https://www.unocha.org/publication/oslo-guidelines-use-foreign-military-and-civil-defence-assets-disaster-relief

The nature and timing of the military component of a response to a disaster is guided by several factors, including international guidelines, host country requests, and the role and responsibility of the military within its own country. While most governments use military and defence assets when there is no civilian assistance available at the time, some governments use domestic military as a primary responder rather than as a last resort.[44] For example, the Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO) acknowledges that the military can play a vital and early part in disaster responses.[45] As a result, a military force will deploy mission-specific capabilities determined in response to its government's guidance and in concert with the other government agencies involved in the response.

The cluster approach

The concept of the cluster approach was an outcome of the UN's humanitarian reform process in 2005, which sought to improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian response system. The cluster approach promotes system-wide response preparedness and technical capacity by ensuring predictability, leadership and accountability in all the main sectors or areas of humanitarian response. At the global level there are 11 generic clusters (shown in Figure 12), each led by a designated agency.

44 ACMC, HAG, AHA Centre, OCHA 2020. *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model*. https://humanitarianadvisorygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/RCG_Towards-a-predictable-model_2nd-ed__Final_electronic.pdf

45 APC-MADRO 2014. *Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations*, Version 8.01. UN OCHA, Geneva.

Figure 12: The 11 global clusters and the global cluster lead agencies[46]



Several governments have adopted the cluster approach by creating national cluster systems, such as in the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nepal and Vanuatu. National cluster systems often differ in structure and scope from the global one.

In addition to its response coordination role, a country-level cluster system can function as a preparedness coordination platform.

NDMOs and other organisations that are part of a country-level cluster system may also collaborate regionally. Box 5 describes this kind of collaboration in the Pacific region.

46 OCHA. 'What Is the Cluster Approach?'. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters/what-cluster-approach

Box 5 – Key coordination structures in the Pacific

In the Pacific region, the peak body of NDMOs is the Pacific Islands Emergency Alliance (PIEMA), which comprises NDMOs, the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police Conference and the Pacific Islands Fire & Emergency Services Association.

FRANZ agreement

Disaster relief coordination arrangements exist between France, Australia, and New Zealand under the FRANZ Agreement on Disaster Relief Cooperation in the South Pacific (1992). The FRANZ agreement is primarily a coordination mechanism between the three countries. It is activated through a request from the host country following a disaster in the Pacific region. When this happens, signatories will identify ways to coordinate response efforts and optimise resources and assets. Other regions have similar frameworks in place, with localised mechanisms and details.

Pacific Humanitarian Team

The Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT) is a network of humanitarian organisations working together to assist Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs) to prepare for and respond to disaster. The PHT's area of responsibility covers 14 PICTs: Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

The PHT consists of humanitarian organisations which have technical expertise and operational resources to support disaster preparedness and response. It works with Pacific governments and partners to ensure that necessary arrangements and systems are in place to support nationally led disaster responses.

continued overleaf...

Figure 13: Pacific Humanitarian Team structure



Information sharing

One of the key functions of humanitarian civil-military-police coordination is information sharing to enable effective responses for affected communities. This can require the collection, analysis, transmission and storage of sensitive data and personal information.

Information sharing is an activity to support humanitarian operations; it should not be confused with intelligence gathering for political or military purposes. OCHA's guidance[47] encourages responsible sharing of information that can support the identification of humanitarian needs and inclusion. This includes disaggregated data that encompasses people living with disability, diverse sex and gender identities, minorities, older people, children, and other key groups for whom there are additional barriers to accessing essential services.

Sharing information between humanitarian, police and military organisations allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the context and associated humanitarian priorities. However, information sharing must not place affected communities at risk or endanger the safety and security of humanitarian staff. OCHA's Data Responsibility Guidelines[48] identify key principles for data responsibility (see Table 3). These principles underpin how information and data should be treated and shared in humanitarian civil-military-police coordination mechanisms and interactions.

47 OCHA 2021. *Recommended Practice for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters*. https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/180918%20Recommended%20Practices%20in%20Humanitarian%20Civil-Military%20Coordination%20v1.0.pdf

48 The Centre for Humanitarian Data 2021. 'The OCHA Data Responsibility Guidelines'. https://centre.humdata.org/the-ocha-data-responsibility-guidelines

Table 3: Principles for data responsibility

Principles for data responsibility in humanitarian action	
Accountability	Confidentiality
Coordination and Collaboration	Data Security
Defined Purpose, Necessity and Proportionality	Fairness and Legitimacy
Human Rights-Based Approach	People-Centred and Inclusive
Personal Data Protection	Quality
Retention and Destruction	Transparency

There are various ways of sharing civil-military information in addition to face-to-face meetings. The Humanitarian ID platform and the Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (V-OSOCC) are two examples. Key resource datasets can be found at the Humanitarian Data Exchange, Humanitarian Response, and Humanitarian ID websites.

Humanitarian agencies, just like governments, have been the target of cyber-security attacks leading to data breaches. This can have serious repercussions for crisis-affected communities and can also undermine their trust in those who provide assistance. As this is the context in which humanitarian civil-military-police coordination now occurs, there is increasing hesitation about sharing information. To strengthen the system and allow critical information to be shared during humanitarian operations, the ICRC has published a handbook on data protection in humanitarian action that outlines principles for data processing and security.[49]

49 ICRC. *Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action*. https://www.icrc.org/en/data-protection-humanitarian-action-handbook

Chapter 4: Responding to disasters

Host countries have the primary responsibility to protect and assist people in their territories who are affected by disaster. Humanitarian action is designed to support the host country in fulfilling its responsibilities and to complement aspects of the response at the host country's request; it should neither undermine nor supplement state responsibility. If an emergency overwhelms the capacity of the host government to respond, international assistance may be requested and accepted. This assistance may span the spectrum of international humanitarian organisations (both NGO and IGO) to multinational police and military forces, as described in Chapter 3.

In this crowded environment, it is understandable that challenges and issues will arise as agencies respond in line with their organisational mandates, objectives, cultures, languages and philosophies. What follows in this chapter is a brief description of these challenges, specifically in relation to disasters occurring in times of peace. While this emphasis on disasters in peacetime may seem an arbitrary distinction, it is often the case that the challenges involved, the international laws invoked, and the existing guidance documents used are different from those used in complex emergencies and thus deserve separate attention. Complex emergencies are covered in Chapter 5.

Key challenges

Disaster response is an area where civil-military-police relationships tend to be less contested and contentious. As already highlighted, host country militaries often play a substantial role in disaster response. Many governments look to their militaries to be a principal responder to domestic disasters, and militaries often are the first major responder outside the affected population.

In a disaster environment, the humanitarian community acknowledges that military deployments to disaster zones may follow government direction and recognises the capacity of the military to provide rapid deployment of medical, logistics and engineering capabilities. In this context, non-military

stakeholders are more likely to coordinate their activities with the military. Nevertheless, challenges and issues remain; these are discussed below.

Climate change, natural hazards and environmental concerns

The impacts of climate change already have significant repercussions for how governments, militaries, police, and humanitarian agencies prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters and complex emergencies. The World Risk Index highlights Oceania as the most at-risk region and Vanuatu as the most at-risk country in the world, with Solomon Islands ranking second, Tonga third and Papua New Guinea ninth.[50]

As the scale, scope and frequency of disasters increases, there will be more response operations where humanitarian agencies and militaries are operating in the same space. There are additional challenges that will test the readiness of responders, including sea level rise, intensifying and compounding hazards, damage to electricity and telecommunications infrastructure, elevated social tension, mass migration, water scarcity, and depleted food security. These conditions will hinder the resources and capability of responding agencies as well as complicate the operating environment.

Coordination among military, police and humanitarian agencies will be critical as climate change stretches resources beyond capacity and renders current capabilities less effective. These environmental and climate influences will impact the ability of military actors to respond effectively to disasters.

In addition to dealing with the impacts of climate change, we need to consider the environmental impact of disaster response operations themselves. This is relevant both to military actors and to humanitarian agencies. The concept of green humanitarian action has arisen in recognition of this. It refers to 'strengthening environmentally friendly approaches to meeting humanitarian needs and measurably reducing harmful impacts of the humanitarian system on the climate and environment'.[51]

50 'World Risk Report 2022 – Focus: Digitalization'. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/worldriskreport-2022-focus-digitalization

51 IFRC 2021. Green Response Introduction https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/Green-Response-Intro-Oct-2021.pdf

There are various tools[52] and initiatives that responding agencies can draw upon to make their operations more environmentally responsible (see Figure 14). As humanitarian agencies and militaries both engage in the assessment, logistics and distribution of humanitarian materials, it is critical that dialogue takes place from the outset of an emergency with regard to reducing the environmental impacts of the response, which lead to other humanitarian impacts.

Figure 14: Environmental responsibility tools[53]



52 European Commission 2022. *Guidance on the Operationalisation of the Minimum Environment Requirements and Recommendations for EU-Funded Humanitarian Aid Operations*. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/environment/guidance_on_the_operationalisation_of_the_mers_for_eu-funded_humanitarian_aid_operations.pdf

53 HAG, CFST and MORDI 2022. *Treading Gently: Building on Positive Environmental Practice in the Tonga Volcano Response*. Humanitarian Horizons. HAG, Melbourne. https://humanitarianadvisorygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HAG-HH2-PP_Real-time-Analysis_Tonga.pdf

Aligning humanitarian coordination mechanisms with command and control

Common obstacles to coordination are the difference in organisational mandates and cultures; and tensions regarding the time and speed required for effective response and coordination. During a humanitarian crisis, coordination mechanisms present a way to bring together diverse humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent and principled response to emergencies. These coordination mechanisms seek to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response. One form of humanitarian coordination is through the cluster approach described in Chapter 3.

Coordination is not a 'command and control' mechanism. It is unlikely that external directives are given to agencies within the clusters. Instead, clusters are reliant on consensus, cooperation and information sharing to gain a comprehensive picture of the situation, mobilise resources to address needs and avoid duplication of effort. The clusters can coordinate joint assessments, identify the gaps and requirements guided by the Sphere standards (see Box 6), map out 'who is doing what where', develop action plans, engage in advocacy if appropriate, and carry out evaluations and contingency planning.

From military and police perspectives, this approach can appear disorganised, as the web of relationships does not fit comfortably with their organisational approaches to coordination and planning. Nevertheless, it is critical that militaries and police participate in the coordination mechanisms of the overall response. In the cluster coordination approach, for example, contact between the military and the cluster group leaders may be facilitated through OCHA or through invitations for military personnel to attend cluster meetings. These invitations may be issued on an ad hoc basis or in specific contexts. In these circumstances, an invitation would normally be passed from a cluster lead to the military through a UN CMCoord officer.[54] It is

54 A UN CMCoord officer advises the humanitarian community leadership on civil-military issues and facilitates the establishment, maintenance and review of appropriate relations between humanitarian and armed actors present in a disaster response or complex emergency. For more information, see United Nations 2008, *Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook*, version E1.1; or UN OCHA 2014, *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: A Guide for the Military*.

essential that the military recognise that they cannot attend cluster meetings without an explicit invitation from the cluster lead.

Not all responders participate in the cluster system. Coordination goes beyond the cluster system and the cluster arrangement cannot be expected to resolve all coordination issues. Efforts are underway to increase the involvement of local and national actors in coordinating response agencies and resources. An example of this work is the IASC's guidelines for strengthening participation, representation, and leadership of local and national humanitarian actors.[55]

Prioritisation

In a disaster response, there are competing needs and stakeholder priorities. The host country's military response and supporting foreign military forces will be guided by the host government's priorities. In most cases, this will align with the efforts of the international humanitarian community. In circumstances where there may be competing priorities, the host country's priorities and requirements take precedence. For the military, this often requires managing others' expectations of how and where military assets are allocated. For the humanitarian community, this means being realistic in requests for support from military assets.

Access to resources

During a disaster response there is considerable competition for resources and use of infrastructure such as ports, airports, air space and transport facilities. Coordinating these efforts, prioritising need and allocating or tasking resources and assets can create significant challenges. Stakeholder operational and organisational demands can strain the best intentions for cooperation and coordination of effort. To leverage capabilities and resources, constant and consistent collaboration and communication among

55 IASC 2021. 'IASC Guidance on Strengthening Participation, Representation and Leadership of Local and National Actors in IASC Humanitarian Coordination Mechanisms'. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/operational-response/iasc-guidance-strengthening-participation-representation-and-leadership-local-and-national-actors

stakeholders is essential to meet the host country's requirements effectively and efficiently.

Equitable access and distribution of resources among affected populations regardless of gender identity, religion, nationality etc. is a standard consideration in humanitarian operations. It is important to consider that some vulnerable groups require more resources than others in order to receive equitable access to resources.

Length of deployments

The length of deployments for military, police and humanitarian agency personnel will differ considerably, so it is a constant challenge to keep track of the respective contacts from various groups. Most will be deployed for a number of months; however, individuals may rotate in and out at different times. This constant churn of personnel means that staff are frequently trying to develop working relationships with new staff when they arrive, handover efforts often suffer, and knowledge management becomes a core issue. Local populations and community representatives are also challenged as they seek to build trust and relationships with constantly changing contacts. Trust needs to be developed between all stakeholders as early as possible to maintain communication and understanding.

Planning approaches

A distinction between military and civilian agencies is their different approaches to planning. The military employs assumption-based planning, while police and the humanitarian sector conduct needs-based assessments.

Table 4: Key differences between military and civilian planning, environment and end-states[56]

	Military	Civilian
Planning	■ Fact and assumption-based ■ Highly structured ■ Centralised, hierarchical ■ Advance planning ■ Clear delineation of tasks	■ Flexible and dynamic ■ Delay detailed planning ■ Responsive to 'on the ground' ■ Devolved decision-making ■ Needs-based
Environment	■ Manage environment	■ Respond to environment
Desired end-state	■ 'Return to normalcy'	■ 'Build back better'

The difference between these approaches is that militaries will conduct planning based on known information and make documented assumptions about information that is not yet available, with these assumptions validated as the planning continues. The assumption-based approach allows for the military to plan more quickly than the needs-based approach.

However, it is important to note that there can be issues with assumption-based planning in disaster response, such as incorrect and/or poor allocation of resources, which may cause overcrowding and logistic blockages.

Preparedness and contingency planning are also part of the humanitarian community's disaster management cycle. However, once a disaster strikes, the humanitarian community focuses heavily on needs-based programming and responses. This means that while some program activities are known prior to the disaster, the response will always be contextualised by the current situation, the assessed needs of the affected populations, and the complementarity between responding agencies and government entities. As a result, needs-based planning takes longer.

56 M Bowers and G Cherne 2014. 'A Lessons Framework for Civil-Military-Police Conflict and Disaster Management: An Australian Perspective', in *Evidence-Based Lessons Learned for Organizational Innovation and Change*, IGI Global.

Health emergencies

Traditionally military organisations are not considered the primary stakeholder in responding to health emergencies. However, cases such as the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa, the Zika virus disease outbreak in Brazil and the COVID-19 pandemic have shown that multisectoral collaboration, including between civil and military actors, can contribute positively to the response to a health emergency.

Critical roles for the military during a health emergency response include:

- supporting logistics and supply chain management
- providing additional medical or other personnel as surge capacity
- delivering key response activities such as (in relation to COVID-19 specifically) supporting contact tracing, testing and vaccination, and participating in border controls.

Furthermore, as part of the need for innovative multisectoral approaches to implementing the International Health Regulations (IHR),[57] it is acknowledged that militaries should be incorporated not only during the response phase but also in preparedness. This is vital to inform a coordinated and timely humanitarian response during a health emergency.

World Health Organization (WHO) guidance on developing national civil-military health collaboration frameworks which strengthen health emergency preparedness identifies the areas in which military health stakeholders can contribute to reinforce the IHR core capacities:

- Legislation and financing
- IHR coordination and national focal point functions
- Zoonotic events and the human-animal interface
- Food safety
- Laboratory
- Surveillance
- Human resources

57 WHO 2016. International Health Regulations (2005) Third Edition. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241580496

- National health emergency framework
- Health service provision
- Risk communication
- Points of entry
- Chemical events and radiation emergencies.

WHO guidance recommends that the process of building civil-military-police coordination should consider the strengths and challenges facing the public health sector and military health services, and develop and advance capacities that help both organisations prevent, detect and respond to public health emergencies.[58]

How do we respond better?

The accepted norm among stakeholders is that disaster relief should be:

- as civilian as possible and as military as necessary
- as local as possible and as international as necessary.

Recognised international guidance recommends that military assets only be used when 'no comparable civilian alternative' is available. The Oslo Guidelines (see Box 6) offer guidance on when and how foreign militaries and civil defence assets are used in disaster response. Specifically, they should only be used:

- when there is a humanitarian gap – i.e. no comparable civilian alternative to meet humanitarian needs
- to complement existing relief mechanisms
- to provide specific support for specific requirements
- at the request (or at least with the consent) of the affected state
- as part of relief actions that remain the overall responsibility of the affected state

58 WHO 2021. *National Civil–Military Health Collaboration Framework for Strengthening Health Emergency Preparedness: WHO Guidance Document*. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/343571/9789240030343-eng.pdf

- under civilian control – meaning civilian direction and coordination
- at no cost to the affected state and, in principle, covered by funds other than those for international development activities
- in such a way as to avoid dependency on military resources
- within a limited timeframe.

Many governments, especially in South-East Asia, have determined that their militaries are first responders to disasters or integrated with their disaster management structure. To this end, guidelines have been developed to assist all stakeholders in managing their relationships with each other (see Box 6).

Box 6 – Guidelines and minimum standards in disaster response

There are several important guidelines of which all stakeholders need to be aware.

The **International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) Guidelines (Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance)** are meant to assist governments to improve their own disaster laws with respect to incoming international relief, ensuring better coordination and quality.

The **Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations**[59] are a reference guide for member states that should be read in conjunction with the Oslo Guidelines. Both of these sets of guidelines are voluntary and non-binding and do not in any way affect the rights, obligations or responsibilities of states and individuals under international law.

Country/situation specific guidelines and guidance on humanitarian civil-military-police coordination and the use of military and civil defence assets exist for several countries, including South Sudan, Haiti, Pakistan, Chad, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Liberia.

59 APC-MADRO 2014. *Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations*, Version 8.01.

The **Sphere Handbook, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response**, sets out minimum standards of response in key life-saving sectors: water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items; protection principles; and health action. The Sphere Handbook outlines the ideal minimum standards that all stakeholders should aim to achieve in any humanitarian response in order for disaster-affected populations to survive and recover in stable conditions and with dignity. These guidelines are intended for use by the humanitarian community in a range of settings, including disasters and complex emergencies.

Chapter 5: Responding to complex emergencies

What are complex emergencies?

Complex emergencies can be described as crises that result from a combination of instabilities interacting with each other, including political, socio-economic, demographic and environmental instabilities.

Many parts of the world have been affected by acute, chronic and protracted complex emergencies. Complex emergencies typically lead to significant humanitarian crises and needs. These crises:

- may be intra-state or inter-state in nature
- may entail internal political conflict that becomes internationalised – for example, when a foreign military enters a conflict to support a government or an armed opposition group
- involve areas where local allegiances are often blurred or unclear and where many non-state actors (including rebel groups, militias, and private military and security companies) are engaged in the conflict
- can overlap with other crises, including natural hazards and large-scale public health emergencies, such as epidemics or pandemics
- tend to see humanitarian and development assistance delivered by entities that may also be a party to the conflict
- are highly politicised and/or militarised operating environments that have a heightened security risk for all involved, including members of a supporting foreign military or police force, government agencies and the humanitarian community
- require intensive and extensive coordination between militaries, police and civilian responders in efforts that encompass all aspects of humanitarian aid and protection to the host country's civilian population

- affect men and boys differently from the way they affect women and girls, who carry a disproportionate burden of the impact of conflict through gender-based violence, inequitable access to food and resources, and unequal participation in peacebuilding or negotiation processes.

Interaction between civilian, military and police components in complex emergencies is far more difficult and challenging than it is in a disaster response. In complex emergency settings, humanitarian and development programs are often being implemented while there is open conflict or when peace may still be fragile. Thus, along with the humanitarian community and donors, there may also be host country, multinational and peacekeeping military forces and police units.

It is also in these environments that multiple stakeholders provide the widest array of services, ranging from humanitarian and development assistance to inputs into stabilisation activities such as rule of law, security sector reform, reconciliation, and good governance.

Peacekeeping is one among a range of activities undertaken by the UN to maintain international peace and security throughout the world.

UN peacekeeping is guided by three basic principles:

- Consent of the parties
- Impartiality
- Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

While UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities.

Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations facilitate the political process; protect civilians; assist in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants; support the organisation of elections; protect and promote human rights; and assist in restoring the rule of law.

UN peacekeeping operations may use force to defend themselves, their mandate and civilians, particularly in situations where the state is unable to provide security and maintain public order.

In addition to UN peacekeeping other UN activities are:

- **conflict prevention and mediation**
- **peacemaking**
- **peace enforcement**
- **peacebuilding.**

Conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement rarely occur in a linear or sequential way. Experience has shown that they should be mutually reinforcing. If they are used piecemeal or in isolation, they fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict and hence reduce the risk of conflict recurring.

Conflict prevention
Conflict prevention involves diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict.

It includes early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the UN Secretary-General's 'good offices', preventive deployment of UN missions, or conflict mediation.

Peacemaking
Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.

The Secretary-General may exercise his or her 'good offices' to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organisations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently.

Peace enforcement
Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorisation of the Security Council. The Security Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter when deploying troops into volatile post-conflict settings where the state is not able to maintain security and public order.

It is used to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilise, where appropriate, regional organisations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority and in accordance with the UN Charter.

Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the state and seek to enhance the capacity of the state to carry out its core functions effectively and legitimately.[60]

The obligations of IHL in environments of armed conflict are extremely important in these circumstances. IHL is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects people who are not, or are no longer, participating in hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.

While the rules may vary slightly depending on the context, IHL provides that the parties to an armed conflict bear the primary obligation to meet the needs of the population under their control. Impartial humanitarian organisations may offer their services, particularly where the parties to the conflict are unable to meet those needs on their own. Impartial humanitarian activities undertaken in situations of armed conflict are subject to the consent of the parties to the conflict. A party to a conflict must consent to

60 UN Peacekeeping: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en

such activities when the needs of the population under their control are not met. IHL obliges all states, including the parties to the conflict, to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief.[61] It balances this obligation with state sovereignty, also clarifying that humanitarian activities under IHL are subject to conflict parties' right of control.[62]

Recent trends

In recent years we have seen increasingly geopolitically charged complex emergencies – such as those in Syria, Yemen and Ukraine – with fragmented operating environments involving not only the state parties to the conflict but also foreign military involvement through direct intervention or proxy support for state or non-state parties to the conflict, private military and security companies and NSAGs.

Such contexts present numerous challenges where parties to armed conflict and humanitarian organisations engage in different aspects of humanitarian response. On one hand, there can be an overlap in mandates and aims where militaries seek to improve the welfare of civilian populations. On the other, maintaining distinction between humanitarian and military actors is crucial, to avoid bringing the principled character of the civil society response into question.

For the past two decades, a key issue of civil-military-police coordination during complex emergencies has been how humanitarian agencies can maintain a principled response in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism contexts and amid larger stabilisation efforts or peacebuilding initiatives. This is especially problematic when one party (or more) to the conflict has been designated as a terrorist group by governments or international organisations.

Additionally, complex emergencies can raise questions about how closely humanitarian organisations should engage with armed actors. Such questions arose in Afghanistan, for example, when humanitarian organisations engaged with Western military-led provincial reconstruction

61 ICRC 2022. 'Starvation, Hunger and Famine in Armed Conflict'. https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4642-starvation-hunger-and-famine-armed-conflict

62 ICRC 2014. 'ICRC Q&A and Lexicon on Humanitarian Access'. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/2014/icrc-q-and-a-lexison-on-humanitarian-access-06-2014.pdf

teams.[63] Humanitarian actors confronted a different manifestation of this challenge during the Battle of Mosul in Iraq in 2014. During the Mosul trauma response, health responders were co-located or embedded with Iraqi military forces. This raised questions about how closely humanitarian organisations and private health responders should engage with militaries.[64]

The COVID-19 pandemic brought new attention to humanitarian-military relations. As the pandemic unfolded, militaries across the globe played a role in treating patients, regulating population movements, delivering vaccines, and even developing vaccines.[65] NSAGs also were important stakeholders in the COVID-19 response.[66]

Looking to the future, militaries and humanitarian organisations have begun to imagine and prepare for the possibility of large-scale combat operations, including between peer-to-peer or near-peer military competitors.[67] The vast majority of armed conflicts over the past several decades have been non-international in character. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, commencing in February 2022, offers hints as to possible future conflicts that may be international, pose the threat of nuclear escalation, and involve large-scale population mobilisation directed to the war effort.

Such contexts may have drastic implications for future civil-military-police interactions in responding to complex emergencies. This chapter explores these contemporary challenges and those likely to persist or emerge in the future. It highlights key stakeholder considerations, followed by a brief discussion of shared challenges.

---

63 Simone Haysom and Ashley Jackson 2013. '"You Don't Need to Love Us": Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan, 2002–13'. *Stability* 2(2).

64 Paul Spiegel et al. 2018. 'The Mosul Trauma Response: A Case Study'. Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health. http://hopkinshumanitarianhealth.org/assets/documents/Mosul_Report_FINAL_Feb_14_2018.pdf

65 R Grace, ST Boland and J Kaplan 2021. 'Civil-Military Engagement During Public Health Emergencies: A Comparative Analysis of Domestic Responses to COVID-19'. https://assets.researchsquare.com/files/rs-801094/v1/4c00d099-6587-43ae-b925-fb5ead46c20f.pdf?c=1639429784

66 Jori Breslawski 2022. 'Armed Groups and Public Health Emergencies: A Cross-Country Look at Armed Groups' Responses to COVID-19'. *Journal of Global Security Studies*.

67 Brittany Card, Rob Grace and Tarana Sable 2022. 'Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conflict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations'. https://watson.brown.edu/chrhs/files/chrhs/imce/research/HA-GPC-LSCO_Report-February-2022.pdf

Key challenges

Unlike responses to disasters, where civil-military-police relationships tend to be less contentious, the challenges in complex emergencies can be polarising. This polarisation is partly due to the environment and partly a result of stakeholders with different mandates operating in the same space. Stabilising and rebuilding weak or failing states is particularly challenging where social and security institutional infrastructure is ineffective or even non-existent. These states are plagued by internal conflicts in which the civilian population is often the target. Additionally, complex emergencies bring other dimensions into civil-military-police interactions. These include issues related to the provision of humanitarian aid and civilian protection – areas where militaries, police and civil society responders all have a relevant mandate and a role to play.

Challenges through the lens of the humanitarian community

It must be remembered that, despite some similarities, there are three distinct types of aid agencies, and their relationships with armed actors and with governments vary accordingly. This relates directly to the roles and responsibilities of the different agencies.

UN agencies have a responsibility under the UN Charter to be directly involved with issues of international peace and security, and they have an obligation to work with their members – the states that make up the United Nations. In development contexts, they are therefore very likely to work closely with host country and member state government departments, including those involved in law and order. They may work directly on security issues, be comfortable with travelling together with government and military actors in the field, and even perform a security function directly. Specialist UN humanitarian agencies operating in more fragile contexts – most notably OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP – generally aim for more independence, particularly in relation to the populations and partners they are trying to assist. As a rule, humanitarian convoys will not use armed escorts. However, in very exceptional circumstances UN humanitarian agencies may accept the use of military and armed escorts as a last resort to enable humanitarian action. Before deciding on such exceptions, the consequences of and possible alternatives to the use of armed escorts must always be considered.

UN humanitarian agencies are guided by UN General Assembly resolutions 46/182 and 58/114, which articulate the centrality of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence to humanitarian work.

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has a different role in relation to governments. It operates either as an independent auxiliary to the humanitarian services of government (in the case of national societies) or as an entirely independent and neutral humanitarian organisation under a legal mandate provided by the Geneva Conventions (in the case of the ICRC). In both cases, the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement mean that the Movement must consistently demonstrate absolute impartiality, neutrality and independence. Its representatives will not accept armed escorts (except for possible extraction operations in extremis) and will take care to distance themselves in the field. The ICRC works closely, constructively and confidentially with militaries and police forces to monitor compliance with IHL.

NGOs vary greatly between individual agencies in their attitude to interaction with military personnel. In some circumstances no contact at all will be advocated, particularly where the military is a party to the conflict.

Operationally NGO staff may face particular issues such as whether to use military assets, how to share information appropriately, how to approach armed security, what to do if they witness abuses by armed actors, and irregular demands for payment or other relief assets. For some NGOs, sharing the operational space with the military may not be an option at all.

The alignment of aid activities, real or perceived, with political objectives can result in parties to the conflict labelling aid organisations as legitimate targets. One of the greatest challenges for NGOs providing humanitarian assistance is how to avoid becoming, or even the appearance of becoming, an instrument of political or ideological objectives, while maintaining access and operational capability. Multi-mandated organisations such as World Vision or Save the Children are caught in this paradox: as agencies committed to providing relief (according to the humanitarian principles), they also conduct public and private advocacy and carry out development programs that may align with the interests of host or donor governments.

Comprehensive or whole-of-government approaches and the UN integrated mission model may increase fears among NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and even some specialist humanitarian UN agencies that humanitarian action may be subordinated to broader political or military goals. However, many of these actors recognise that some degree of coordination, consultative planning and good working relations is crucial for effective and safe operations.

The challenge for aid agencies is how to work with other stakeholders without compromising humanitarian principles and thus risking being targeted or losing acceptance by the local population. A more pragmatic approach may be appropriate in some circumstances, while strict adherence to principles may be more appropriate in others. Situational analysis is critical in making this decision.

NGOs often work in unstable and austere environments, meaning they must take significant risks to be effective. To manage risk, they often adopt three key strategies: acceptance, protection and deterrence.

Acceptance is the principle of reducing the threat to NGO personnel by gaining local assent to their work. Acceptance begins with direct dialogue and engagement with members of the community, particularly leaders of various ethnic and religious groups. This approach is characterised by proactive relationship building in the field, and is a key enabling factor in effective humanitarian operations.

Protection is the principle of reducing the risk, but not the threat, by reducing personnel vulnerability. Protection entails the security of physical assets and infrastructure, as well as that of aid workers. The disadvantage of pursuing a security strategy emphasising protection is projecting a potentially negative image by 'bunkering down'. Physical separation from the community in which NGOs operate can create negative perceptions of the organisation among the affected community.

Deterrence reduces the risk by containing the threat with a counter-threat. Deterrence is a traditional security approach that involves armed protection of assets and personnel or 'softer' deterrence approaches, including the possibility of publicly denouncing (or threatening to do so) armed actors responsible for risks to humanitarian security.

Ultimately NGOs seek to strike a balance between protection and deterrence, with a stronger emphasis on acceptance. Nevertheless, implementing acceptance strategies involves many complications, including:

- how to cultivate acceptance simultaneously with a wide range of stakeholders that view one another with acrimony
- how to navigate the need to build relationships and coordinate with armed actors while maintaining distance
- how to balance relationship-building efforts with more confrontational approaches when armed actors fuel civilian protection risks
- how to make decisions about compromises when purely principled humanitarian action is evidently not possible.[68]

Three issues are particularly pertinent for civil-military-police coordination. One issue is **humanitarian negotiation**, which in recent years has increasingly been emphasised as a core competency necessary for effective humanitarian action.[69] Humanitarian negotiation with armed actors on issues of access, security and civilian protection has been adopted as a key element of coordination with armed actors.

A second issue is **the use of armed escorts**. The 'IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts or Humanitarian Convoys' states that humanitarian actors should use armed escorts only as a 'last resort' and sets out a framework to guide decisions on this issue.[70] However, intense debates persist about how to determine when the resort to armed escorts is necessary. These debates are of critical importance, especially as

68 Julia Brooks and Rob Grace 2020. 'Confronting Humanitarian Insecurity: The Law and Politics of Responding to Attacks Against Aid Workers'. *Journal of Humanitarian Affairs*. https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/journals/jha/2/1/article-p11.xml
Rob Grace and Alain Lempereur 2021. 'Four Dilemmas of Acceptance: Insights from the Field of Humanitarian Negotiation'. GISF. https://gisf.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Four_Dilemmas_of_Acceptance_insights_from_the_field_of_humanitarian_negotiation.pdf

69 Rob Grace 2020. 'The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Cultivating Capacity across the Aid Sector'. *Negotiation Journal* 36(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12307

70 IASC 2013. *IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys*. https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Armed%20Escort%20Guidelines%20-%20Final.pdf

using armed escorts can jeopardise humanitarian actors' adherence to the principles of neutrality and independence.

A third issue is the use of the **humanitarian notification system** (HNS) in particularly volatile settings. The intention is to inform conflict parties of humanitarian movements and locations requiring protection in accordance with IHL (see Box 7). This system relies on rigorous humanitarian civil-military coordination to function as intended. On one hand, humanitarian actors must share accurate and timely geographic coordinates and movements; on the other, parties to the conflict must establish reliable and consistent information-sharing structures to pass on information at all relevant levels. If this coordination is lacking, there is little likelihood that the HNS will usefully inform military targeting practices or increase the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and operations. The effectiveness of the HNS also depends on the conflict parties' adherence to IHL.

In addition to the points raised above, there are other challenges for the humanitarian community:

- Although there are various globally agreed civil-military-police guidelines and some country specific guidelines, as noted in Chapter 4, there seems to be very limited uptake and socialisation of these guidelines, concepts and practices, in particular those relating to the use of armed escorts.
- Terminology is still a challenging area for communication between the humanitarian community and militaries.
- There is a persistent view that 'we (military, police and humanitarian community) are all here for the same reason' – which is not the case. A clear understanding of different mandates is needed before real dialogue or coordination can take place. It is important to understand that the humanitarian community does not take direction from militaries or governments; it does not gather intelligence; it does not engage in 'hearts and minds' projects; and it is not a force multiplier.

Box 7 – Humanitarian notification systems

Due to the number of attacks on humanitarian organisations in complex emergencies, particularly on hospitals and health care workers, the humanitarian notification system (HNS) has been increasingly used in the wake of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2286 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (2016).

Previously known as the humanitarian notification system for deconfliction (HNS4D), the HNS has the primary objective of informing the conflict parties of humanitarian movements and locations that are to be protected against attacks and incidental effects of attacks under IHL.[71] UN OCHA manages the HNS interface, which informs conflict parties of humanitarian locations (both mobile and static) and movements by sharing global positioning system (GPS) coordinates.

The HNS provides complementary information for military planners to ensure that airstrikes and other kinetic operations will not impede humanitarian operations or people engaged in humanitarian activities. This can help to increase the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and operations while minimising humanitarian access constraints resulting from the conduct of hostilities and military operations.

Using the HNS is voluntary, and the non-use of the HNS by any humanitarian actor does not remove protection under IHL. Similarly, there is no IHL requirement for a humanitarian organisation to obtain the parties' approval for each individual humanitarian facility, activity or movement. The HNS is not a mechanism for conflict parties to approve or deny specific humanitarian operations, movements and activities.

The HNS has been operational in a range of conflict settings including in Syria, Yemen, Libya, the occupied Palestinian territory, Niger and Ukraine. For all country-specific contexts where the HNS is in use, there are detailed processes and standard operating procedures that define the scope, coverage, eligibility criteria, information requirements, frequency etc. of notifications.[72]

71 IHL Customary Rule 56: 'The parties to the conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions. Only in case of imperative military necessity may their movements be temporarily restricted.'

72 OCHA is developing global HNS operational guidance to improve standardisation.

Figure 15: Humanitarian notification system standard operating procedures in Syria, established in April 2020



Challenges through the lens of the military

Given the scope of tasks within complex emergencies, many militaries will deploy as part of a multiagency endeavour. The key focus of military involvement will be improving the security situation sufficiently to allow the appropriate civilian organisations to operate effectively and safely. In circumstances of extreme insecurity, military forces may be required to contribute to wider civil tasks in addition to establishing a robust security framework. In fact, the Law of Armed Conflict obliges parties to a conflict to facilitate and allow the passage of impartial humanitarian relief through

territory under their control, in order to access civilians in need.[73] In addition, it imposes an obligation on all parties to provide basic food, shelter, and medical supplies and services to the civilian population, within their capabilities.

These obligations continue post-conflict in areas under military control or occupation. Civilian expertise should be integrated into operational planning and execution of civil tasks whenever possible, including gender or inclusion advisors. The way immediate humanitarian needs are met may affect long-term development and governance structures. Processes should be consistent with the needs and priorities of the local population. As permissiveness increases, civil tasks should be handed over, as soon as is practicable, to the host country government or other civilian agencies.

Specific challenges pertaining to the military include:

- Strict military security protocols can impede the timely release of information sought by IGOs and NGOs, which can make coordination challenging and strain civil-military relationships.
- Many IGOs and NGOs will seek military protection *in extremis* and, if necessary, support to evacuate. If this expectation of support is within these organisations' emergency plans, then these expectations need to be discussed and negotiated with the military as early as possible in their planning processes. Preferably this should be conducted through civil-military-police coordination mechanisms and in accordance with existing guidelines.
- The ability of militaries, IGOs and NGOs to meet in a neutral setting may be limited. At times a meeting house will be established outside a secure military perimeter. Often, however, as movement to this location is limited or undesirable, alternative and creative methods to communicate are required, including identifying and using existing coordination mechanisms. In the first instance, contact should be made with the UN CMCoord officer to facilitate communication.

73 The Law of Armed Conflict is also known as international humanitarian law (IHL).

Challenges through the lens of the police

Humanitarian response during complex emergencies may involve host country police, internationally deployed police, and police units of international peace missions.

Police vary greatly between different countries – and even between cities or regions in the same country – in terms of their sensitisation and training in disaster preparedness and response, as well as their overall connection to the local population. For example, during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the Philippines, police in some regions fuelled local security concerns because of their 'militarised' approach; whereas police in other regions of the country were welcomed as responders, partly due to their charitable efforts.[74]

Internationally deployed police can play an important role in crisis response. For example, in the wake of the 2002 bombings in Bali, the Australian Federal Police were deployed to assist the Indonesian National Police in their investigation of the attack.

Formed police units (FPUs) as components of international peace missions can play a vital role in promoting civilian protection. For example, in the UN mission in Darfur, FPUs within the mission were better situated than military components of the mission to promote civilian protection, as police were not perceived as combatants in the conflict. The FPUs also had a higher proportion of women, which increased their acceptance by and effectiveness with communities.[75]

Fragile states[76] are often characterised by an absence of effective or legitimate governance structures and institutions, including the police and military, which as a result sometimes can act with impunity, thus exacerbating the problem of instability. There is often no effective or

74 CHRHS 2022. *Humanitarian-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies: Evidence, Insights, and Recommendations*. https://watson.brown.edu/chrhs/files/chrhs/imce/partnerships/Civ-Mil/PRM%20Report%205_26.pdf

75 Marta Ghittoni, Léa Lehouck, and Callum Watson 2018. *Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations: Baseline Study*. Geneva. https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Elsie_Baseline_Report_2018.pdf

76 See Annex 1 for definition.

legitimate criminal justice system, or broader justice system, within which to hold individuals, or indeed institutions, to account for malpractice.

Many of these societies are characterised by violence and other criminal activity. Left unchecked, these activities can become widespread to the extent that they can threaten the legitimacy of the state itself. Such societies are particularly vulnerable to corruption and transnational organised crime, reinforcing the need to strengthen police institutions and for multijurisdictional cooperation in these circumstances.

Traditionally the philosophical underpinnings of many international interventions have featured significant military input, particularly in relation to planning. This is particularly evident when working with the United Nations. There are sound reasons for this, including the fact that the military sectors in most troop-contributing countries are better organised, trained and resourced, and often more experienced, than their police counterparts. Nonetheless, planning will be improved if, in addition to military considerations, other perspectives, including those of the police, are considered.

Operational complementarity between police and military is a prime concern. As peacekeeping remains largely dominated by military thinking and practice, issues in relation to police-military cooperation should be addressed.

Another challenge facing internationally deployed police is their mission mandate, as it is a key factor in their safety and effectiveness. Although police are trained in the use of lethal force and many carry side arms in the execution of their normal duties, the actual use of force, including lethal force, is a last resort in self-defence or in defence of third parties at risk of death or serious injury. Additionally, many international mission mandates may prohibit the carrying of firearms and the use of force.

Mandates for deployed police in complex emergency responses are intended to consider the security needs of their personnel operating in the host state. However, sometimes the reality on the ground does not match the requirements of the mandate.

It is also important that missions with particular policing needs are assigned police with the appropriate capabilities to carry out the required duties. There is a wide spectrum of policing activities. If a mission requires paramilitary duties, for example, it cannot be fulfilled by assigning police who are limited to constabulary roles in their home state.

In complex emergencies, host nation police should ideally retain primacy in relation to the maintenance of law and order. However, should the situation become so difficult that existing resources are overwhelmed, the military can be called upon to assist. In extreme circumstances, the military can assume primacy under conditions of martial law, but this is rare. The resumption of host nation police primacy as early as possible should be an automatic presumption.

Specific challenges for the police include:

- Expectation management is required in relation to what duties police can perform, in both a physical and a legal sense.
- Members of the humanitarian community and military may have preconceived ideas of the role of the police in their home country, particularly if they come from a liberal democracy, and may think that police can perform this same role in the host country. This can lead to misconceptions.
- There needs to be a clear understanding of the different mandates that police have in complex emergencies. For example, one mandate may authorise the police to perform executive policing functions and thus actively investigate crime and/or be armed, but others may not.
- Recognition that some police forces are not 'paramilitary forces' can be difficult to achieve. In liberal-democratic societies this approach to policing has historically been actively discouraged.
- Some host country police or military institutions maintain power by force and are likely therefore to be reluctant to relinquish that power, thereby exacerbating preconditions for further instability.
- Information-sharing protocols, including some serious legal issues, vary between the police and military, and may affect timely information sharing.

- In non-permissive environments, often there is a requirement for military security primacy. This requires police officers to develop an understanding of military protocols to work effectively and safely together.
- Policing approaches, roles and standards and common policing concepts vary around the world. To work together effectively, police need to develop an understanding of their role within the mission and find commonalities with other police officers to achieve effective working relationships and work within the mission's mandate.
- Police are increasingly involved in longer-term capacity building initiatives, which may be part of the response to a complex emergency. The challenge is to convey to other stakeholders that, although results may not be evident in the short term, these initiatives will lead to improved and sustainable law and order in the longer term.
- Ensuring stability and law and order may, intentionally or not, prop up incumbent political regimes. 'Authoritarian' policing models draw their legitimacy and direction directly from the (head of) state, or even political parties of the state. This can make it hard for internationally deployed police to align with local police that are progressing political imperatives.

Shared challenges

In addition to sector-specific challenges, there are challenges that affect multiple stakeholders.

Disaster response in complex environments

Stakeholders have increasingly been called upon to respond to disasters and large-scale public health emergencies occurring in complex emergencies. The challenges of working in these environments are multiple, not just from a single agency or sector perspective but also in relation to stakeholder relationships. Even before a disaster strikes, these environments are characterised by insecurity and weak or weakened institutions and systems. In these fragile environments, a disaster may further destabilise the affected state and create additional pressures and demands on existing capacities.

Response can be significantly hampered if, for example, those who have previously deployed and/or been posted to an affected state as part of a mission or agency response are themselves victims of the disaster, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, which affected civilian responders, armed actors and local populations alike.

Further, decision-making regarding redirection of assets and personnel must be weighed against the impact on ongoing activities. Allocation of resources, mobilisation of multiple stakeholder effort, and access to those most in need become critical and pose significant and unique coordination challenges. Other responses, ranging from provision of security and protection of civilians to intra-agency coordination, are overlayed with an increased number of intra-sector stakeholders (e.g., affected state and foreign militaries); all require a level of understanding and stakeholder cooperation/coordination that is developing among stakeholders.

Gender

Armed conflict and disasters are inherently gendered crises; they can affect women/girls and men/boys in profoundly different ways. It is increasingly accepted that understanding these differences – such as adopting a gender perspective – improves the effectiveness of responses to these crises.[77] 'Gender mainstreaming' refers to the process of integrating a gender perspective into all activities. The strategy of gender mainstreaming has been widely adopted by the UN system, national governments, non-governmental and other intergovernmental organisations.

Box 8 – UNSCR 1325

Unanimously adopted in 2000, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 formally recognised the link between women's experiences in armed conflicts and maintaining levels of peace and security internationally. It was the culmination of decades of work by civil society and women's groups, particularly in conflict-affected countries, to highlight the experiences of women and the important roles women and girls play

77 Sarah Shteir 2013. *Gendered Crises, Gendered Responses – The Necessity and Utility of a Gender Perspective in Armed Conflicts and Natural Disasters: An Introductory Overview*. Australian Civil-Military Centre.

in conflict prevention, peace processes and promoting peace and security. UNSCR 1325 establishes four key pillars to be addressed in support of its overarching aims: the participation of women at all levels of decision-making; the protection of women from sexual and gender-based violence; the prevention of violence against women, through the promotion of women's rights, accountability and law enforcement; and the mainstreaming of gender perspectives in peace operations.[78] The participation pillar is often overlooked and needs to be strengthened to elevate not just women's participation but also women's leadership and decision-making.

UNSCR 1325 has had a widespread effect but there are criticisms that member states have failed to deliver fully on its promises. This is of particular concern regarding conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. The majority of survivors of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence are women and girls. A report by the Human Rights Council[79] highlighted that rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence were found during the conflict in Myanmar in the Rakhine, Kachin and Shan states. These violations include arbitrary deprivation of life; rape; torture and other inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary and unlawful detention; forced labour; and sexual slavery. Experts say those in the populations who are most at risk of this type of violence are refugee and internally displaced women and girls, unaccompanied girls, displaced women and girls in urban settings, and women and girls with physical and mental disabilities.[80]

Policy and operational adoption of a gender perspective helps improve situational awareness during a response, including better understanding of the vulnerabilities, risks, threats, needs, priorities and interests of the local population. This perspective can assist operations to prioritise tasks; develop targeted programming; and ensure more accurate, effective and equitable service provision.

78 UN Women National Committee for Australia 2014. *Women, Peace and Security: An Introductory Manual*. Australian Civil-Military Centre, p. 19.

79 Human Rights Council 2019. 'Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Myanmar and the Gendered Impact of Its Ethnic Conflict'. https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/sexual-and-gender-based-violence-myanmar-and-gendered-impact-its-ethnic-conflicts

80 United Nations 2002. *Women, Peace and Security: Study Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to SCR 1325*. New York.

A gender approach recognises that women are disproportionately affected in conflict and disaster situations due to pre-existing gender inequalities. During conflict or disaster, gender inequalities are exacerbated. This can manifest in many ways, including sexual and gender-based violence, a lack of access to basic resources, and exclusion from formal conflict prevention, reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts.[81] In conservative societies, cultural taboos may prevent women from receiving aid and medical care provided by male relief workers. In Pakistan following floods in 2010, restrictions on women's movement without male accompaniment had particularly severe consequences for female-headed households, who were 'left out of the distribution system'.[82] In the floods in 2022, women still faced similar challenges, placing them in a high-risk situation. In addition, the floods caused significant damage to health care infrastructure, and nearly 130,000 pregnant women were in need of urgent health services.[83]

Each civil-military-police stakeholder has different ways of approaching gender in complex emergencies. Challenges to addressing gender are not only found in the field but also require the integration of gender issues into training and planning before conducting response efforts.

Stabilisation challenges

Stabilisation encompasses a range of activities such as establishing peace; early efforts to resuscitate markets, livelihoods and services; and efforts to build a government's core capacities to manage political, security and development processes.

Stabilisation approaches differ across countries and are not always used in situations of armed conflict. Stabilisation approaches recently have been

81 UN Women National Committee for Australia 2014. *Women, Peace and Security: An Introductory Manual*. Australian Civil-Military Centre, p. 5.

82 Asia-Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development 2006. *Guidelines for Gender Sensitive Disaster Management: Practical Steps to Ensure Women's Needs Are Met and Human Rights Are Respected and Protected*.

83 UNFPA 2022. 'Women and Girls in Pakistan Need Urgent Health and Protection Services amid Epic Flood Disaster'. https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/women-and-girls-pakistan-need-urgent-health-and-protection-services-amid-epic-flood-disaster

used in Afghanistan (before the Taliban takeover of the country in August 2021), Timor-Leste, Iraq, Pakistan, the Solomon Islands and Syria.

Under the banner of stabilisation, stakeholders may pursue parallel sets of objectives relating to security, political and development objectives. In environments where stabilisation approaches are used, humanitarian assistance can be more easily perceived as supporting political agendas rather than humanitarian objectives (including the challenges of integrated missions). This perception may jeopardise the personal safety of members of the humanitarian community and their access to affected populations. Further, it has been argued by some within the humanitarian community that more evidence is required to demonstrate improved security and stability benefits from this approach.

How do we respond better?

Efforts to improve humanitarian response have been indicated in relation to various initiatives mentioned in the previous chapters, such as localisation, cluster systems and updating guidelines. It is important to embed those initiatives into preparedness activities through education, training or joint exercises in advance of humanitarian crises. To avoid reinventing the wheel or creating unnecessary parallel mechanisms, it is helpful also to become familiar with and to use the guidelines, standards and mechanisms that already exist.

In addition, understanding the context is essential to inform a fit-for-purpose strategy for civil-military arrangements. We need to bear in mind that there is no one-size-fits-all coordination model. Even though there are some potential commonalities between contexts, treating each context as a unique situation will lead to a better response.

Key guidance includes the MCDA Guidelines (see below), which have been developed by both humanitarian and military actors and can be adapted across a range of contexts. Operationalising guidance such as this can allow enhanced coordination and processes which can boost complementarity of action.

Box 9 – MCDA Guidelines

In complex emergencies, the non-binding and voluntary Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies are particularly important. Often called the 'MCDA Guidelines', they provide guidance on the use of international military and civil defence personnel, equipment, supplies and services in support of the UN's pursuit of humanitarian objectives in complex emergencies. They speak to such issues as when these resources can be used, how they should be employed, and how UN agencies can best coordinate with international military forces regarding the use of military and civil defence assets.

Concepts central to the MCDA Guidelines are:

- Requests for military and civil defence assets can only be made on humanitarian grounds.
- MCDA should be employed only as a last resort in the absence of civilian alternatives.
- Humanitarian operations using military assets must retain their civilian nature and character.
- The use of MCDA should be limited in scale and scope.
- Countries providing military personnel to support such operations should ensure respect for UN codes of conduct and the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.
- While military assets remain under military control, the humanitarian operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the civilian authority.

Chapter 6: Useful tips

This guide is ultimately about building trust, respect and relationships through shared understanding. The following quick tips for improving civil-military-police interactions are aimed at fostering this understanding. While there will continue to be areas of disagreement, our individual and collective goal should always be to work better, whether together or separately.

This can be achieved in the same space and with different mandates.

Prioritise local ownership, leadership and knowledge

- Recognise, respect, and elevate local leadership in emergency response

Seek out information

- Be curious about the context, learn who is usually involved in a humanitarian response and think beyond the traditional humanitarian actors. Know which civil-military-police guidelines are applicable to the context.

Try not to revert to your last deployment

- Analyse information from the community you are currently in; leave your prejudice behind, listen and be patient.

Get your facts about other organisations and prioritise

- All organisations active overseas have different goals, values, resources, size and limits. A little prior research and knowledge of organisational mandates, objectives, capacities and programs can go a long way to improving your job.
- Understand how your roles are relevant to other organisations and priorities.
- Identify and focus on key players and main coordinators. Seek advice. Depending on context, this could be a CMCoord officer, a UN OCHA humanitarian affairs officer, or a WFP HMI officer.
- Stakeholders deploying in response to a disaster need to identify which clusters are active and establish contact with OCHA to avoid duplication of effort and facilitate cooperation where achievable and appropriate. When interested in interacting with clusters, stakeholders need to check the terms of reference.
- Don't ignore local stakeholders, including local NGOs, women's organisations, and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. Learn about your community through religious leaders, community representatives and others. Involve local community actors/ stakeholders as early as possible

Simplify language – your goal is to be understood

- All other stakeholders need to understand your mandate and your role in their own terms. Talk to one another. Link to the local context in articulating your mandates and roles. Be accessible.
- Avoid acronyms, as confusion around terminology is often a barrier to mutual understanding.

Identify common program areas

- Determine how your activity affects other organisations' activities. For example, if your mandate includes capacity building, be informed by what other stakeholders are doing in that area.
- Use consultation and dialogue to ensure the program areas align with the humanitarian needs.

Meet other organisations constructively

- Everyone should consider neutral venues for liaison. If you are a member of the police or the military, ensure visits to the humanitarian community are by prior arrangement and consider the appropriate level of interaction.
- Many agencies within the humanitarian community have a no-gun policy. This is also true with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Do not enter their premises armed. Seek alternative ways to engage.
- Don't assume *Western* personnel are in charge. Consider the appropriate level of interaction.

Build productive relationships

- Actively develop strong personal networks. Reach out to build relationships and consider informal engagement with other organisations. This will allow you to develop genuine relationships.

Be prepared

- Engage with other organisations *before* an emergency occurs. It is important to invest in these relationships over the long term. Engage in exercises, forums and conferences and, if possible, meet diaspora members.

Take advantage of existing coordination structures

- Identify if there is a civil-military-police coordination forum or focal point and determine if this is appropriate for you to attend or to reach out to. OCHA and the cluster system are recognised coordination mechanisms. If participating in an open forum is not appropriate, seek other ways to interact.

Be proactive in information sharing

- Communicate; don't control. Wherever possible, exchange information with other organisations and do not be insular. Think about information that other organisations may need and that you can share. Sharing information is foundational to building a common understanding of the situation.
- Be mindful when sharing information that in some contexts there may not be an established system in place for data and information protection.

Commit and deliver

- Never promise anything you cannot deliver or are not authorised to do, even (and especially) out of good intentions. Broken promises can have a worse effect than no promise.
- Clearly communicate your timeframe and plan of transition.

Don't get distracted from what is really important

- During crises it is easy to be bombarded and overwhelmed by information and requests – keeping what is important front and centre is a challenge, but critical.
- In a world that reels from crisis to crisis, man-made and natural, wherever you work, whatever your skill set or domain, you need to keep on point. When the pressures are high and time is short, identify your main thing and keep it foremost in your mind. Don't waste time on other things. Keep your main thing, the main thing.

We are keen to improve our repository of useful tips. Please send any tips that have worked well for you to communications@acmc.gov.au

Annex 1: Abbreviations and acronyms

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ACFID	Australian Council for International Development
ACMC	Australian Civil-Military Centre
AFP	Australian Federal Police
APC-MADRO	Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations
CA	Civil affairs
CFE-DM	Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standard
CIMIC	Civil-military cooperation
CMI	Civil-military interaction
CMCoord	Civil-military coordination
CMCS	UN OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Section
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre
CSO	Civil society organisation
CTF	Combined Task Force
DFAT	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
FMA	Foreign military assets
FPU	Formed police unit
FONGTIL	Timor-Leste NGO Forum
FRANZ	France, Australia and New Zealand
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship

HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HMI	Humanitarian military interaction
HNS	Humanitarian notification system
HNT	Humanitarian Notification Team
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDRL	International Disaster Response Law
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGO	Intergovernmental organisation
IHL	International humanitarian law
IHR	International Health Regulations
MCDA	Military and civil defence assets
NSAG	Non-state armed group
NDMO	Natural disaster management organisation/office
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PHT	Pacific Humanitarian Team
PICT	Pacific Island Countries and Territories
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PIANGO	Pacific Islands Association of Non-governmental Organisations
PIEMA	Pacific Islands Emergency Alliance

PMSC	Private military and security company
PPF	Participating Police Force
PoC	Protection of civilians
PSEAH	Prevention of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RCRC	International Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement
RSIPF	Royal Solomon Islands Police Force
SI	Solomon Islands
SIPDP	Solomon Islands Police Development Program
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNFPA	UN Population Fund
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHCT	UN Humanitarian Country Team
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UN OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
VOICE	Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Annex 2: Resources

By chapter

Chapter 1 Why do we need this guide?

APC-MADRO. 2014. Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations, Version 8.01. https://disasterlaw.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/media/disaster_law/2021-03/Asia%20Pacific%20Guidelines_0.pdf

Australian Government Department of Defence. 2022. 'Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office'. 12 December 2022. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/complaints-incident-reporting/sempro

UN OCHA. 2022. Global Humanitarian Overview. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2022?_gl=1*1rvxrp6*_ga*MTAzMzI0OTAzMS4xNjY1NjEyODc5*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTY2NTYxMjg3OS4xLjEuMTY2NTYxMjg5OS40MC4wLjA

ALNAP. 2022. The State of The Humanitarian System. ALNAP/ODI. https://sohs.alnap.org/#:~:text=THE%202022%20STATE%20OF%20THE,%2C%20policy%2Dmakers%20and%20donors

UN OCHA. 2018. Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters. https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/180918%20Recommended%20Practices%20in%20Humanitarian%20Civil-Military%20Coordination%20v1.0.pdf

IASC. 2013. IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys. https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Armed%20Escort%20Guidelines%20-%20Final.pdf

UN OCHA. 2017. UN-CMCoord: A Guide for the Military 2.0. https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Guide%20for%20the%20Military%20v2.pdf

UN OCHA. 2006. The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies. https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Guide%20for%20the%20Military%20v2.pdf

UN OCHA. 2007. Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief. https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/OSLO%20Guidelines%20Rev%201.1%20-%20Nov%2007.pdf

United Nations. 2022. 'Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Prevention'. https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/prevention#:~:text=Prevention%20lies%20at%20the%20core%20of%20the%20UN,staff%2C%20raising%20public%20awareness%2C%20and%20conducting%20risk%20assessments

United Nations. 2022. 'Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Training'. https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/training

Chapter 2 Key actors in times of crisis

The Montreux Document. https://www.montreuxdocument.org/about/montreux-document.html

UN/WEF. Guiding Principles for Public-Private Collaboration for Humanitarian Action. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/World%20Economic%20Forum%20-%20OCHA%20Guiding%20Principles%20for%20Public-Private%20Collaboration%20in%20Humanitarian%20Action.pdf

UN OCHA. 2013. Disaster Response in Asia and the Pacific: A Guide to International Tools and Services. https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/ROAP/Promotional%20Materials/Disaster_Response_in_Asia_Pacific.pdf

UN OCHA. 2014. Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: A Guide for the Military. https://www.unocha.org/themes/humanitarian-civil-military-coordination?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI5MbAqKab_QIVEhdgCh3fYAFzEAAYASAAEgKJlPD_BwE

ICRC. 2014. 'The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols'. International Committee of The Red Cross. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols

Lawry, Lynn. 2009. Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military. The Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/ngo-guide.pdf

Bulles, Anni-Claudia, and Shannon Kindoray. 2013. 'Beyond Aid: A Plan for Canada's International Cooperation'. The North-South Institute. https://www.academia.edu/5375556/Beyond_Aid_A_Plan_for_Canadas_International_Cooperation

OCHA. 2007. Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, Revision 1.1. https://www.unocha.org/publication/oslo-guidelines-use-foreign-military-and-civil-defence-assets-disaster-relief?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIw4zA8vjc-gIVN5RmAh0-XgU4EAAYASAAEgJy5vD_BwE

APC-MADRO. 2014. Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations, Version 8.01. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/asia-pacific-regional-guidelines-use-foreign-military-assets-natural-disaster-response

The Humanitarian Futures Programme. 2013. The Private Sector Challenge Report. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/private-sector-challenge-final-report

ICRC. 1994. The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm

ACFID. n.d. 'Australian Council for International Development (ACFID)'. https://acfid.asn.au/about

ALNAP. 2022. 'ALNAP 1997–2022'. https://www.alnap.org

Australian Government, Australian Civil-Military Centre. 2022. 'ACMC'. https://www.acmc.gov.au

CIVICUS. 2022. 'Who We Are'. https://www.civicus.org/index.php/who-we-are-2/about-civicus

CHS Alliance, Groupe URD, and Sphere. 2022. Core Humanitarian Standard. https://corehumanitarianstandard.org

Geneva Call. 2022. 'Geneva Call: Protecting Civilians in Armed Conflict'. https://www.genevacall.org/#

InterAction. 2022. 'Who We Are'. https://www.interaction.org/about-interaction

ICVA. 2022. 'About ICVA'. https://www.icvanetwork.org/about-icva

UN OCHA. 2022. 'About OCHA'. https://www.unocha.org/about-ocha

Australian Red Cross. 2022. 'We Are Red Cross'. https://www.redcross.org.au/about

Sphere. 2022. 'Home: About'. https://spherestandards.org/about

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), Swiss Confederation, and ICRC. 2009. The Montreux Document. https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/135841/montreux_document_en.pdf

Whitefield, Teresa. 2010. Engaging with Armed Groups: Dilemmas & Options for Mediators. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/mediation-practice-series-engaging-armed-groups-dilemmas-options-mediators

Demeyere, Bruno. 2022. International Review of the Red Cross. http://international-review.icrc.org/authors/bruno-demeyere

Bangerter, Oliver. 2011. 'Talking to Armed Groups'. *Forced Migration Review* 37 (March). https://www.fmreview.org/non-state/Bangerter

Mack, M, and J Pejic. 2008. 'Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts'. ICRC. https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0923-increasing-respect-international-humanitarian-law-non-international-armed-conflicts

Geneva Call. 2022. 'Protecting Civilians in Armed Conflict: Documents'. https://www.genevacall.org/documents

Chapter 3 Mandates, missions and concepts

UN OCHA. 2019. 'Minimum Package of Services on Access'. https://resourcecenter.undac.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Presentation-on-Humanitarian-Access.pptx

IASC. 2021. 'The Grand Bargain 2.0: Endorsed Framework and Annexes'. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain-official-website/grand-bargain-20-framework-and-annexes-deenesfr-0

ALNAP. 2015. The State of the Humanitarian System. https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/alnap-sohs-2015-web.pdf

Hunt, Charles, Luisa Ryan, Kate Sutton, Beth Eggleston, Jessica Lees, Sally Airs Shevach, and Alex Lia. 2020. From Principle to Practice: Protecting Civilians in Violent Contexts. https://www.acmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-04/ACMC_POC_Manual_Final%20.pdf

Chapter 4 Responding to disasters

UN OCHA. n.d. UN-CMCoord Field Handbook: Version 2.0. https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/%5BE-Version%5D%20UNCMCoord%20Field%20Handbook%202.0%20%282018%29.pdf

World Health Organization. 2021. National Civil–Military Health Collaboration Framework for Strengthening Health Emergency Preparedness: WHO Guidance Document. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/343571/9789240030343-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Bowers, M, and G Cherne. 2014. 'A Lessons Framework for Civil-Military-Police Conflict and Disaster Management: An Australian Perspective'. Evidence-Based Lessons Learned for Organizational Innovation and Change. IGI Global. http://www.irma-international.org/chapter/a-lessons-framework-for-civil-military-police-conflict-and-disaster-management/117330

APC-MADRO. 2014. Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations, Version 8.01. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/asia-pacific-regional-guidelines-use-foreign-military-assets-natural-disaster-response

OCHA. 2007. Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, Revision 1.1. https://www.unocha.org/publication/oslo-guidelines-use-foreign-military-and-civil-defence-assets-disaster-relief?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIw4zA8vjc-gIVN5RmAh0-XgU4EAAYASAAEgJy5vD_BwE

Sphere Association. 2018. *Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. Fourth Edition. Geneva. https://spherestandards.org/wp-content/uploads/Sphere-Handbook-2018-EN.pdf

IFRC. 2022. Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief'. https://www.ifrc.org/our-promise/do-good/code-conduct-international-red-cross-and-red-crescent-movement-and-ngos

Eckstein, David, Vera Künzel, and Laura Schäfer. 2021. 'Global Climate Risk Index 2021: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2019 and 2000–2019'. https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/global-climate-risk-index-2021

Global Climate Risk Index. https://www.germanwatch.org/en/19777

Chapter 5 Responding to complex emergencies

OCHA. 2008. 'Civil-Military Guidelines and References for Complex Emergencies'. 2008. http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines or http://www.reliefweb.int

IASC. 28 June 2004. 'Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies – An IASC Reference Paper'.

MCDA. 2003 (revised January 2006). Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines).

IASC. 2013. Guidelines on the Use of Military Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys.

UN DPKO. 2008. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines ('Capstone doctrine'). https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/DPKO%20Capstone%20doctrine%20(2008).pdf

IASC. 2001. 'Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys – Discussion Paper and Non-binding Guidelines' (14 September).

IASC and OCHA. 2008. Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies. https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ENGLISH%20VERSION%20Guidelines%20for%20Complex%20Emergencies.pdf

ACMC. 2013. Gender Crises – Gendered Responses: The Necessity and Utility of a Gender Perspective in Armed Conflicts and Natural Disasters: An Introductory Overview. https://www.acmc.gov.au/resources/publications/gendered-crises-gendered-responses

OCHA. 2018. Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets (FMA) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-KC0_hFtUkZjsQd0ZeuqO8B8XI0FEbXX/view

By topic

General

Australian Civil-Military Centre website. http://www.acmc.gov.au

Australian Council for International Development Code of Conduct. http://www.acfid.asn.au/code-of-conduct

Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (1994). https://www.ifrc.org/our-promise/do-good/code-conduct-movement-ngos

The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (2014). https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/Core%20Humanitarian%20Standard%20-%20English.pdf

The Core Humanitarian Standard and the Sphere Core Standards, Analysis and Comparison (2015). https://spherestandards.org/comparing-the-core-humanitarian-standard-and-sphere-core-standards

Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War. Mary B Anderson (ed), Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder/London (1999).

Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles. https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/home-page.html

Humanitarian // Military Dialogue. https://sites.google.com/dialoguing.org/home

Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: A Guide for the Military. OCHA (2014). https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/UN%20OCHA%20Guide%20for%20the%20Military%20v%201.0.pdf

IASC Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response (2006). https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters/document/iasc-guidance-note-using-cluster-approach-strengthen-humanitarian

Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response (SCHR). Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations (2010). http://reliefweb.int/node/25231

United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook (2008). http://reliefweb.int/node/23775

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines ('Capstone Doctrine'). UN DPKO (2008). http://www.un. org/en/peacekeeping/resources/policy.shtml

UN OCHA Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Publications. http://www. unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/ UN-CMCoord/publications

World Humanitarian Summit. https://www. worldhumanitariansummit.org

International disaster response

Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines), Updated November 2006 (Revision 1.1 November 2007). http://reliefweb.int/node/22924

Treading Gently: Building on Positive Environmental Practice in the Tonga Volcano Response. Humanitarian Advisory Group, Civil Society Forum of Tonga and MORDI (2022). https://humanitarianadvisorygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HAG-HH2-PP_Real-time-Analysis_Tonga.pdf

UN OCHA Disaster Response Preparedness Toolkit. https://www.unocha.org/themes/preparedness-and-risk-management

The World Customs Organisation (WCO) directory lists national focal points and legislation, instruments and tools related to the movement of emergency relief aid, as well as international resolutions. http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/activities-and-programmes/natural-disaster.aspx

Complex emergencies

Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Policy and Studies Series vol. 1, no. 4. UN OCHA (2011). https://www.unocha.org/publication/aide-memoire-consideration-issues-pertaining-protection-civilians-armed-conflict

Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper. London: Department for International Development (2010). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-peaceful-states-and-societies-a-dfid-practice-paper

Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies. UN OCHA and IASC (2008). https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ENGLISH%20VERSION%20Guidelines%20for%20Complex%20Emergencies.pdf

Enhancing Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence. ICRC (2008). https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0956.pdf

Global Burden of Armed Violence, Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008). http://www.genevadeclaration.org

Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups. OCHA (2006). https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/HumanitarianNegotiationswArmedGroupsManual.pdf

Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies ('MCDA Guidelines') (2003), revised January 2006. http://ochaonline.un. org/cmcs/guidelines

Handbook on UN Multidimensional Operations. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf

Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Paris: OECD DAC (2007). https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/38368714.pdf

Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility. United States Agency for International Development (2011). https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/supporting-statebuilding-in-situations-of-conflict-and-fragility_9789264074989-en

To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments. OCHA (2011). https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Stay_and_Deliver.pdf

Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys – Discussion Paper and Non-binding Guidelines. IASC (2001). https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Armed%20Escort%20Guidelines%20-%20Final.pdf

Field reports

Humanitarian Response. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info

Relief Web. http://reliefweb.int/home

UN OCHA Situation Reports. https://reports.unocha.org

UN OCHA Humanitarian News and Analysis. https://www.unocha.org

International Crisis Group Reports. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latest-updates/report

This guide aims to complement the global guidance on humanitarian civil-military coordination that already exists in the following publications.













Annex 3: ADF ranks (Australia)

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE
BADGES OF RANK AND SPECIAL INSIGNIA

NAVY



Admiral ADML | Vice Admiral VADM | Rear Admiral RADM | Commodore CDRE | Captain CAPT | Commander CMDR | Lieutenant Commander LCDR | Lieutenant LEUT | Sub Lieutenant SBLT | Acting Sub Lieutenant ASLT | Midshipman MIDN

ARMY

General GEN | Lieutenant General LTGEN | Major General MAJGEN | Brigadier BRIG | Colonel COL | Lieutenant Colonel LTCOL | Major MAJ | Captain CAPT | Lieutenant LT | 2nd Lieutenant 2LT

AIR FORCE



Air Chief Marshal ACM | Air Marshal AIRMSHL | Air Vice-Marshal AVM | Air Commodore AIRCDRE | Group Captain GPCAPT | Wing Commander WGCDR | Squadron Leader SQNLDR | Flight Lieutenant FLTLT | Flying Officer FLGOFF | Pilot Officer PLTOFF | Officer Cadet OFFCDT

NAVY

Warrant Officer of the Navy WO-N | Warrant Officer WO | Chief Petty Officer CPO | Petty Officer PO | Leading Seaman LS | Able Seaman AB | Seaman SMN

ARMY

Regimental Sergeant Major of the Army RSM-A | Warrant Officer Class 1 WO1 | Warrant Officer Class 2 WO2 | Staff Sergeant SSGT | Sergeant SGT | Corporal or Bombardier CPL/BDR | Lance Corporal or Lance Bombardier LCPL/LBDR | No Insignia | Private PTE

AIR FORCE

Warrant Officer of the Air Force WOFF-AF | Warrant Officer WOFF | Flight Sergeant FSGT | Sergeant SGT | Corporal CPL | Leading Aircraftman/ Aircraftwoman LAC/W | Aircraftman/ Aircraftwoman AC/W | Non-Commissioned Officer Cadet NCOCDT

DPS-1-PNG5708

Annex 4: AFP ranks (Australia)

www.acmc.gov.au

www.acfid.asn.au